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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2003, the United States Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Georgia v. Ashcroft.' Initially the opinion, which signifi-
cantly altered the established legal test for evaluating retrogression
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,2 failed to garner much atten-
tion. This was in part due to the complex nature of the decision, and
partially because the opinion was issued nearly simultaneously to two
long-awaited "blockbuster" opinions-the rejection of state anti-sod-
omy laws in Lawrence v. Texas3 and the affirmation of the use of af-
firmative action in education in Grutter v. Bollinger.4 Regardless,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's majority opinion in Ashcroft, evaluat-
ing a Georgia state legislature redistricting plan, concluded that an
apportionment plan that moved African American voters from a dis-
trict where they were the majority of voters to one in which they were
a minority but arguably sizeable enough to wield some level of "influ-
ence" over the outcome of the election was not "retrogressive" or other-
wise a violation of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.5
1. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 25-61. For a deeper discussion of Georgia v.
Ashcroft and its problematic reinterpretation of Section 5, see, for example,
Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3
ELECTION L.J. 21, 21 (2004) ("The Court's opinion [in Georgia v. Ashcroft] funda-
mentally alters the pre-clearance process in disturbing ways."). See also id. at
36 (summarizing the holding as "a retrogression in minority voters' effective exer-
cise of the electoral franchise").
3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
5. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 487-89. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia found that the plan eliminated majority-minority districts in areas
where voting was racially polarized and greatly reduced the percentage of the
black voting age population (BVAP) in other majority-minority districts. See
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 95-97 (D.D.C. 2002). Other districts
where the majority of voters were Democrats saw the BVAP rise to levels between
20091
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Following Justice O'Connor's extensive thirty page opinion in Ash-
croft was a small, two paragraph concurrence from Justice Anthony
Kennedy. 6 At just under 300 words, Kennedy's opinion was brief, but
it packed an ominous punch. Kennedy agreed that the redistricting
scheme did not violate the statutory requirements of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act.7 But Kennedy's greater concern was that the ap-
portionment plan potentially violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.8 In his own majority opinion in Miller v.
Johnson,9 Justice Kennedy had written that race cannot be the pre-
dominant factor in redistricting.lO As such, Kennedy concluded in
Ashcroft, "considerations of race that would doom a redistricting plan
under the Fourteenth Amendment or Section 2 seem to be what save
it under Section 5."11
Kennedy's concurrence went on to declare: "There is a fundamental
flaw... in any scheme in which the Department of Justice is permit-
ted or directed to encourage or ratify a course of unconstitutional con-
duct in order to find compliance with a statutory directive."12 In other
words, Kennedy hinted, if the Justice Department's interpretation of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act leads attorneys to approve district-
ing plans that violate the Miller v. Johnson interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the statute is fundamentally flawed.
This article seeks to challenge the view that the Justice Depart-
ment's current enforcement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act com-
pels drafters of apportionment plans to use race as a predominant
factor in the districting process, in violation of Miller v. Johnson13 or
its predecessor, Shaw v. Reno.14 Specifically, I argue that a shift in
the Justice Department's behavior in the post-2000 redistricting cycle
and subsequent Supreme Court decisions, such as Easley v. Cromar-
tie,1 5 indicate any dissonance between Section 5 and the Fourteenth
Amendment in the redistricting context is now rectified.
This is apparent in a review of the redistricting cases that followed
the 2000 census, after which every state redrew its district lines as
required under Reynolds v. Sims.16 States were required to adhere to
25% and 50% of the entire district-slightly higher than the overall state average
of 25.42% but less than a majority. Id. at 44.
6. 539 U.S. at 491-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
10. Id. at 911-13.
11. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 491.
12. Id.
13. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
14. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
15. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
16. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that congressional and state legislative districts
must be roughly equal in population under the Equal Protection Clause of the
[Vol. 88:124
SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
the constitutional mandate under Shaw and Miller, and every juris-
diction covered under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was required
to submit their redistricting plans to the U.S. Department of Justice to
ensure that they complied with the non-retrogression standard of Sec-
tion 5. As Part II of this Article details, in no instance was any plan
drawn in compliance with Section 5 found to be unconstitutional
under Shaw or Miller. The fear that compliance with Section 5 re-
quired the Justice Department to encourage or direct "unconstitu-
tional conduct" in drawing district lines was never realized.
Or, at the very least, that fear did not come to pass in the redis-
tricting cycle that immediately followed the establishment of these
principles. The story does not end there. In August of 2006, President
Bush signed the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott
King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of
2006.17 Among other things, the law reauthorized Section 5 for an
additional twenty-five years and specifically clarified the provision
with regards to two previous Supreme Court decisions: Reno v. Bossier
Parrish School Board (Bossier 1)18 and Georgia v. Ashcroft.19
Part III of this Article details these amendments to Section 5. The
amendments specifically require the rejection of any new apportion-
ment plan or other change that is motivated by a discriminatory pur-
pose (thus clarifying the Court's holding in Bossier 1I).20 The changes
also clarify Justice O'Connor's definition of "retrogression" in Georgia
v. Ashcroft to ensure that localities are required, under Section 5, to
protect a minority community's ability to elect their preferred candi-
date of choice.21
So if, as this Article contends, compliance with Section 5 did not
compel any unconstitutional behavior in the 2000 round of redistrict-
ing, the question becomes whether Section 5, as reauthorized in 2006,
will compel any unconstitutional behavior in 2010 and beyond. 22 To
that end, Part III sets forth the argument that none of the changes to
Section 5 during the reauthorization process should give rise to any
concern of unconstitutional behavior. In particular, I detail how the
two aforementioned amendments to Section 5-a reinvigoration of the
U.S. Constitution). Reynolds thus requires all districting plans to be revisited
following every decennial Census to ensure that districts are equally apportioned.
Id.
17. Pub. L. No. 109-246, §§ 4-5, 120 Stat. 577, 580-81 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 1973b-1973c (West 2000 & Supp. 2008)) [hereinafter VRARA].
18. 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
19. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
20. See VRARA, supra note 17. See also infra text accompanying notes 336-354.
21. See VRARA, supra note 17. See also infra text accompanying notes 344-367.
22. The U.S. Supreme Court specifically confirmed in LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399




intent standard and a protection of a community's opportunity to elect
their preferred candidate-do not require authors of redistricting
plans to use race as a predominant factor or otherwise violate the U.S.
Constitution.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SECTION 5, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT, AND CONCERNS OVER THEIR
SHARED EXISTENCE
The United States Constitution and Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act have a historically supportive and amicable relationship, as the
Court articulated shortly after the 1965 passage of Section 5 in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach.2 3 This section seeks to detail both the devel-
opment of Section 5 and the concurrent evolution of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. I argue that the
trajectories of both should be seen more as complementary and com-
patible than inconsistent and obstructive, as Justice Kennedy's con-
currence in Georgia v. Ashcroft24 suggests.
A. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-2006
Section 5 was added to the Voting Rights Act in 1965 to ensure the
systematic enforcement of the statutory prohibition of racial discrimi-
nation in voting, in recognition of the consistent tendency of state and
local jurisdictions to stay "one step ahead" of the federal government
through passing "new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old
ones had been struck down."25 Congress enacted the provision in an
effort to "shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators
of the evil to its victim," through instituting a process that disallowed
any changes to election procedures "unless the changes can be shown
to be nondiscriminatory." 2 6
The provision is notably limited in its application-enforceable
only in states and localities that meet the requirements of its coverage
formula.2 7 The coverage formula is designed to capture jurisdictions
23. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
24. 539 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
25. H.R. REP. No. 94-196, at 57-58 (1975). See also City of Lockhart v. United
States, 460 U.S. 125, 141 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that Section 5
was enacted to ensure "that old devices for disenfranchisement would not simply
be replaced by new ones"); H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 10 (1965) (noting that
"[b]arring one contrivance too often has caused no change in result, only in meth-
ods"). Dan Tokaji describes these patterns among state and local jurisdictions as
"resilient as the many-headed hydra, with new disenfranchising methods repeat-
edly sprouting up in place of the ones most recently removed." Daniel P. Tokaji,
If It's Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 49 How. L.J. 785,
791 (2006).
26. H.R. REP. No. 94-196, at 58 (1975).
27. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
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with a history of discrimination. It therefore includes jurisdictions
that employed a prohibited test or device and in which less than half
its population was registered to vote or voted in the 1964, 1968 or
1972 presidential elections.28 In 1975, coverage was also extended to
jurisdictions with substantial numbers of language minorities that
failed to provide translated election materials.29 As a result of these
extensions, Section 5 coverage now includes nine states-Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina,
Texas, and Virginia-as well as local jurisdictions in California, Flor-
ida, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and South
Dakota. 30
A jurisdiction covered under this formula was required to submit
any new or revised "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting," to the federal
government for approval or "preclearance."31 Congress placed the
power of "preclearance" in the hands of "the safely nonsouthern"3 2
District Court of the District of Columbia and the Civil Rights
Division of the United States Justice Department.3 3 To obtain
preclearance, a covered jurisdiction must generally prove to one of
these entities that its new or revised election procedure "does not have
the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color."34 Though jurisdictions can
obtain preclearance via a declaratory judgment from the District
Court of the District of Columbia, the vast majority opt for a more
efficient and less costly review from the Justice Department, which
completes most preclearance reviews in under sixty days and, in the
view of some commentators, sometimes involves "a brokered give and
take"3 5 between the jurisdiction and the Justice Department Attor-
28. Id.
29. Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975).
30. 28 C.F.R. § 51 app. (2006). The U.S. Supreme Court held in 1999 that covered
local jurisdictions in states that are not entirely under Section 5 must submit any
election law changes made on the state level that are to be implemented in cov-
ered local jurisdictions. Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 269 (1999).
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
32. J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, 1965-2007, 86 TEX. L. REV. 667, 681 (2008) (noting that Congress chose "the
safely nonsouthern District Court of the District of Columbia... to be the princi-
pal venue for vetting new southern election laws that might seek to evade the
movement toward electoral equality").
33. See id. at 679-86 (describing how the Justice Department was given the primary
responsibility for administering Section 5).
34. Id. at 678.
35. Meghann E. Donahue, The Reports of My Death are Greatly Exaggerated: Ad-
ministering Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act After Georgia v. Ashcroft, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1651, 1656 (2004).
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neys.3 6 If the Justice Department objects to the proposal, then the
state or subdivision has the option of appealing to the district court to
obtain a declaratory judgment stating that the law satisfies the re-
quirements of Section 5.37
Because of the sensitive federalism issues involved in its enforce-
ment, and because individual attorneys in the Justice Department
play a significant role in ensuring its application remains consistent
with judicial interpretation, it is no surprise that Section 5 has
evolved considerably since its initial enactment. Apart from the
changes to the coverage formula, the Justice Department has seen an
exponential growth in the number of preclearance submissions-from
roughly 300 in the first five years of its enactment to 50,000 between
2000 and 2002.38 In addition, the provision, as with the Voting Rights
Act in its entirety, has progressed from a law that was initially em-
ployed to dismantle barriers to participation,39 to one that is charged
with reviewing any law that impacts a community's participation or
representation at the state and local level.40 In its 1968 decision in
Allen v. State Board of Elections,41 the Supreme Court liberally de-
fined the scope of the definition of election laws and procedures in the
"broadest possible" manner to include laws regulating "electoral struc-
tures."42 As a result of Allen, Section 5 jurisdictions are required to
obtain preclearance of any redistricting changes or shifts from dis-
36. See id. at 1656-57 (noting that "between 1990 and 1995, the Voting Section ana-
lyzed 2,822 redistricting submissions while jurisdictions submitted just eight
[changes] to the district court for declaratory judgment.... [T]he Department is
and always has been the prime decision maker for Section 5 determinations")
(internal quotations omitted).
37. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
38. Victor Andres Rodriguez, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 After Boerne:
The Beginning of the End of Preclearance?, 91 CALIF. L. REv. 769, 782 (2003)
("[Iln the first five years after the Act's passage ... only 323 Section 5 changes
were submitted to the Attorney General for review. In the next five years
(1970-1974), only 4,153 changes were submitted .... [Tlhe number of submis-
sions increased dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s. Almost 50,000 changes
have been submitted in the three most recent years on record (2000-2002), a
number that exceeds the total submitted in the first fifteen years of the Act's
life."). This growth in submission is detailed and explained by Morgan Kousser,
supra note 32, at 684-85.
39. Tokaji, supra note 25, at 793 ("The first generation of VRA enforcement consisted
mainly of dismantling existing barriers to participation-and preventing new
ones from popping up in their place .... In the seven covered states, the percent-
age of voting-eligible African Americans who were registered rose from just 29%
before the VRA to over 52% by 1967.").
40. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566-71 (1968).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 567.
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trict-based to at-large elections, and any other change that would af-
fect the effectiveness of a citizen's vote. 43
These developments in the scope and meaning of Section 5 are mi-
nor, however, in comparison to the evolution of the standard for evalu-
ating, approving, and rejecting election laws and procedures under
Section 5. Though applied and embodied through the enforcement ef-
forts of the Justice Department, the U.S. Supreme Court has played a
considerable role in driving and defining the progression of this stan-
dard. Most significant is the Court's 1976 decision in Beer v. United
States.4 4 In Beer, the Court instituted the seminal definition for eval-
uating whether a change to an election law or procedure would have
the "effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color,"45 concluding that such an effect occurs only when a voting
change "would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minori-
ties with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral
franchise."4 6 Under the Court's "retrogression" standard, the Justice
Department was directed to compare the electoral opportunities for
voters of color under the previous 4 7 and new provisions, and, in the
absence of evidence of discriminatory intent, reject the plan only if the
attorneys concluded that the new provision would have the effect of
reducing, or retrogressing, the existing electoral opportunities for
communities of color.48
43. Mark Posner, Time Is Still On Its Side: Why Congressional Reauthorization of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Represents a Congruent and Proportional Re-
sponse To Our Nation's History of Discrimination In Voting, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIs.
& PUB. POL'y 51, 67 (2007) (noting that Section 5 currently requires submissions
of election changes that include: (1) voter registration standards, procedures, and
locations; (2) polling place and early voting locations and precinct lines; (3) stan-
dards and procedures for voting on election day or before election day; (4) the use
of languages in addition to English in administering elections; (5) election dates;
(6) methods of election; (7) districting plans; (8) jurisdiction boundaries (because
they determine eligibility to vote in particular elections); (9) candidate qualifica-
tions and qualifying procedures; (10) the number of elected officials and their
term of office; and (11) initiative, referendum, and recall procedures).
44. 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (concluding that Section 5 was enacted to "insure that
no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in
the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the elec-
toral franchise"). For an extensive and detailed description of the facts and back-
ground of Beer, see Kousser, supra note 32, at 692-97.
45. Beer, 425 U.S. at 142.
46. Id. at 141.
47. The "previous" position in the redistricting context is the benchmark plan, de-
fined as the plan that is either in effect when the new plan is submitted for
preclearance, or where the current plan is unconstitutional or otherwise im-
proper, the last constitutional, legally enforceable plan in effect in the state. See
28 C.F.R. §§ 51.54(b)(1), 51.58 (2006); J. Gerald Hebert, Redistricting in the Post-
2000 Era, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 431, 441 (2000).
48. See Hebert, supra note 47, at 440-41.
2009]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
According to Professor Michael Pitts, a former attorney in the vot-
ing section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, in
the decades following the Beer decision, the Attorney General's imple-
mentation of the retrogression "effects" test in the context of reviewing
apportionment plans involved four steps, each in line with the view of
retrogression as articulated in Beer:
[Tihe Attorney General reviewed a plan to determine if there were any dis-
tricts that allowed minority voters to elect candidates of choice[, ... reviewed
Census data to determine if any of these districts underwent a decrease in
minority population[,] . . . examined voting patterns to determine if any re-
ductions in minority population would result in the likelihood that minority
voters would no longer be able to elect a candidate of choice[,] . . . [and] if it
appeared minority voters had lost a district in which they could elect a candi-
date of choice (i.e., a retrogression had occurred), the Attorney General deter-
mined whether an alternative plan could be created that would not result in
the elimination of such a district .... [I]f a plan resulted in an arguable loss of
a district in which minority voters could elect a candidate of choice and a non-
retrogressive plan could be drawn, the Attorney General would deny approval
.. .49
But the Supreme Court's view of which election changes earned
preclearance under Section 5, and the Attorney General's subsequent
implementation of that view, did not end with Beer. Notably, Con-
gress barely touched Section 5 during the 1982 reauthorization pro-
cess, implicitly accepting the Court's interpretation of Section 5 from
Beer and, after much discussion, extended the preclearance require-
ments as they were for an additional twenty-five years.50 The only
significant change was Congress' decision to amend Section 5 to allow
covered jurisdictions to "bailout" from under the purview of the provi-
sion, 5 1 if they could, among other things, produce evidence of their full
compliance with the preclearance requirements and demonstrate that
no test or device had been used to discriminate on the basis of race,
49. Michael J. Pitts, Georgia v. Ashcroi- It's the End of Section 5As We Know It (And
I Feel Fine), 32 PEPP. L. REV. 265, 274-75 (2005).
50. For a detailed and extensive account of the 1982 reauthorization process for the
Voting Rights Act generally, and Section 5 specifically, see Kousser, supra note
32, 704-16. See also Lisa Erickson, The Impact of the Supreme Court's Criticism
of the Justice Department in Miller v. Johnson, 65 Miss. L.J. 409, 412-13 (1995)
(describing the Congressional debate over extending the Section 5 and its en-
dorsement of the Justice Department's work enforcing the provision since its
1965 enactment); id. at 412 (citing S. REP. No. 97-417 at 11 (1982), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 187) ("In making this determination, the [House Judici-
ary] Committee noted that although progress has been made toward equal oppor-
tunity in voting, racial and minority discrimination still affected the right to vote
in states covered by section 5. In fact, the Committee stated that 'without the
preclearance of new laws, many of the advances of the past decade could be wiped
out overnight with new schemes and devices.'").
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(a)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
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color, or language in the past ten years.5 2 The second notable change
came not from Congress but from the Justice Department, which, fol-
lowing the 1982 reauthorization, issued regulations that indicated an
election law change that was a "clear violation" of Section 2 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act was sufficient to "withhold" preclearance. 5 3
It was instead the Supreme Court that instituted the most sweep-
ing changes to the provision, in part due to Justices' apparent disa-
greement with the Attorney General's enforcement of the provision. 5 4
Prior to the late 1990s, the courts and the Justice Department consist-
ently viewed the purpose language of the provision, which "prohibit[s]
any changes enacted with the purpose ... of denying or abridging the
right to vote based on race or color,"5 5 as prohibiting the implementa-
tion of changes motivated by any discriminatory purpose. Specifically,
this meant that under Section 5, in addition to rejecting plans with a
retrogression effect, the Attorney General would also reject voting
changes that would clearly violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
which outlawed efforts to dilute the voting strength of communities of
color,56 and changes that were adopted with an unconstitutional dis-
criminatory purpose.5 7
In one case with two separate holdings, issued four years apart, the
U.S. Supreme Court intervened and curtailed these two practices.
The Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board5s8 cases dealt with the
preclearance of a school board districting plan in Bossier Parish, Loui-
52. Id. See also Posner, supra note 43, at 63-66 (detailing the intent behind the
bailout provision and its subsequent limited successful use by covered
jurisdictions).
53. The regulation in its entirety read: "In those instances in which the Attorney
General concludes that, as proposed, the submitted change is free of discrimina-
tory purpose and retrogressive effect, but also concludes that a bar to implemen-
tation of the change is necessary to prevent a clear violation of amended Section
2, the Attorney General will withhold Section 5 preclearance." 28 C.F.R.
§ 51.55(b)(2) (1994).
54. For further description of the Justice Department preclearance determinations
following the 1990 redistricting cycle, see, for example, Tokaji, supra note 25, at
799-804 (describing the increase of redistricting plans submitted for preclearance
under Section 5 in the post-1990 reapportionment cycle, detailing the perception
that the Justice Department "adopted a policy of requiring the 'maximization' of
majority-controlled districts in the 1990s," and the effect of that perception on
subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence).
55. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
56. Under Section 2, an electoral system violates the Voting Rights Act if it effec-
tively results in members of a racial or language minority having "less opportu-
nity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C.A § 1973(b) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2008). See also Gingles v. Thornburgh, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (holding that
the use of multimember districts in North Carolina legislative apportionment re-
sulted in an impermissible dilution of voting strength among a racial minority).
57. See Pitts, supra note 49, at 276-77.
58. 528 U.S. 320 (2000); 520 U.S. 471 (1997).
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siana, a jurisdiction that previously had been subject to litigation due
to its resistance to school integration laws and policies.59 Despite the
possibility of adopting a plan presented by the local chapter of the
NAACP, which would have created two majority-African American
districts, the School Board adopted a plan which had no majority-mi-
nority districts.60 The plan therefore appeared to be a blatant viola-
tion of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which, at the time of the
Court's decision, was typically interpreted to outlaw districting plans
that failed to create a majority-minority district where it was possible
to create one. It also was possible that the rejection of the NAACP
plan involved a discriminatory motive on behalf of the school board.
The plan was, however, also non-retrogressive because both the pre-
sent and the previous plan had failed to include a majority-minority
district, making the present plan no worse than the previous plan.61
In its 1997 decision in the case Reno v. Bossier Parish School
Board (Bossier I),62 the Court evaluated a Justice Department deci-
sion to deny preclearance to an apportionment plan that clearly vio-
lated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Court in Bossier I
overturned the Attorney General's denial of preclearance, finding that
plans that may dilute minority voting strength in violation of Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act should still survive the preclearance process
if they were non-retrogressive in effect and were not enacted with a
racially discriminatory purpose.6 3
59. For a detailed account of the background leading up to the Bossier Parish cases,
see, for example, Alaina C. Beverly, Lowering The Preclearance Hurdle: Reno v.
Bossier Parish School Board, 120 S. Ct. 866 (2000), 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 695,
696-98 (2000); Charlotte Marx Harper, A Promise for Litigation: Reno v. Bossier
Parish School Board, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 647, 652-55 (2000).
60. Beverly, supra note 59, at 696-97.
61. See Pitts, supra note 49, at 278 ('The Bossier Parish School Board plan presented
a situation where the Attorney General attempted to use Section 2 to force the
creation of majority-minority districts when the jurisdiction already employed
single-member districts. Prior to 1990, the Board had twelve districts, but none
of them had a population comprised of a majority of African-Americans. After the
1990 Census... the Board adopted a redistricting plan that once again failed to
include any district with a majority of African-American population, even though
it would have been possible for the Board to create two such districts.").
62. 520 U.S. 471.
63. Hebert, supra note 47, at 443 ("Over the years, the DOJ denied preclearance to
plans that, even though not retrogressive to minority voters, nonetheless resulted
in discrimination against them (e.g., through dilution, fragmentation, or pack-
ing) .... After the Supreme Court rejected the Attorney General's policy in [Boss-
ier 11, the DOJ subsequently amended its regulations to abandon the policy. As a
result, plans that were free of a racially discriminatory purpose and a retrogres-
sive effect would now have to be precleared even if they diluted minority voting
strength under section 2. The DOJ would be forced to preclear the plans and
then turn around and file suit against the locale under section 2, challenging the
very plan it had just approved.").
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Three years later, the Supreme Court heard the case a second
time. In its 1999 decision in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board
(Bossier II) the Court's focus was on determining whether it was
proper for the Justice Department to deny preclearance in light of evi-
dence that the rejection of the NAACP-backed school board plan may
have been enacted in an effort to suppress the ability of African Amer-
icans to elect their candidate of choice to the school board.64 The ma-
jority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, held that the Justice
Department was not authorized under Section 5 to prohibit the
preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but
non-retrogressive purpose. 65 Thus, following Bossier II, instituted
just prior to the 2000 redistricting cycle, the Justice Department was
under strict direction from the Supreme Court to only deny
preclearance to apportionment plans enacted that were retrogressive
in purpose or effect.6 6
After curbing the Justice Department's discretion to review redis-
tricting plans under Section 5 and limiting the review primarily to the
issue of retrogression in purpose or effect the Supreme Court imposed
additional constraints in its effort to restructure the definition of ret-
rogression in its 2003 decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft.67 Following the
2000 Census, the Justice Department rejected an apportionment plan
for the Georgia State Senate, after concluding that the plan had a ret-
rogressive effect on the ability of African Americans to elect their can-
didates of choice to the state senate. 68 The proposed plan, supported
by many elected African American state legislators,6 9 "unpacked"
many of the state's majority-minority legislative districts, reducing
the voting age population in some from over 65% African American to
just over 50%, and minimizing the African American population in
other districts from just over 50% to 30-40% of the voting age
population. 70
64. 528 U.S. 320 (2000). For a more detailed analysis of Bossier II, see, for example,
Harper, supra note 59, at 655-61.
65. Bossier 11, 528 U.S. at 341.
66. See Harper, supra note 59, at 559 ("Bossier II lowers the bar for future apportion-
ment plans in that even if a plan is discriminatory, so long as it does not have a
retrogressive effect or a retrogressive purpose, it should be precleared .... In
other words, a pre-Bossier II apportionment plan which tried to substantially en-
hance the voting position of minorities would be discriminatory and thus be
denied preclearance. Bossier II allows such a plan to be precleared and conse-
quently, enforceable.").
67. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). For a detailed analysis of the Georgia v. Ashcroft case, see,
for example, Donahue, supra note 35, at 1663-66; Karlan, supra note 2; Kousser,
supra note 32, at 737-41; Pitts, supra note 49, 290-300.
68. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 466-67.
69. Id. at 471.
70. Id. at 470-71.
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The Court rejected the Justice Department's conclusion that the
plan was retrogressive, concluding that Georgia "likely met its burden
of showing non-retrogression" and interpreting Section 5 to allow
states the flexibility to reduce the minority voting age population in
some majority-minority districts "even if it means that in some of
those districts, minority voters will face a somewhat reduced opportu-
nity to elect a candidate of their choice." 71 Under the new Georgia v.
Ashcroft standard, the Court appears to instruct the Justice Depart-
ment to consider the intent of the drafters of the plan over the plan's
actual effect. 72 Specifically, the Attorney General is instructed to ex-
amine whether, in enacting a new districting plan, (1) the local juris-
diction attempted to protect the ability of minority voters to elect their
candidate of choice, (2) whether the minority group currently holds an
opportunity to participate in the political process, and (3) whether lo-
cal minority officeholders supported the plan. 73
Taken collectively, Beer, Bossier I, Bossier H, and Georgia v. Ash-
croft illustrate the significant, if not predominant, role that the Su-
preme Court has played since the 1965 passage of Section 5. As others
have noted,7 4 the opinions illustrate the Court's effort to control and
cabin the Justice Department's discretion in administering Section 5.
The extent to which, during the 2006 reauthorization process, Con-
gress altered this judicial doctrine is detailed in Part III. But any nar-
rative of the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence and view of the Justice
Department's enforcement of the provision must be seen as part and
parcel with its view of the application of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause to race and redistricting during this same
71. Id. 489-90. The Court also noted that the plan created more majority-Democrat
districts and, based on the reasoning that an elected Democrat was more likely to
represent the interests of African American voters than a Republican, the Court
reasoned that the legislature's intent in drawing these district lines to increase
the number of majority Democrat districts protected the interests of African
American voters in Georgia. The Court's opinion emphasized that "a substantial
majority of black voters in Georgia" are registered Democrats and noted that nu-
merous African American elected officials in Georgia-all of whom were Demo-
crats-supported the challenged plan. Id. at 469.
72. See also, Pitts, supra note 49, at 300-01 (observing that the Court's opinion in
Ashcroft "finds as relevant to retrogression, evidence that seems more germane to
an analysis of discriminatory purpose rather than discriminatory effect" and "ex-
plicitly places value on the motive and purpose of Georgia's legislators when dis-
cussing whether the Senate plan meets the new retrogression standard").
73. Id.
74. Tokaji, supra note 25, at 805-06 ("[T]he two Bossier cases, and Georgia v. Ash-
croft are best understood as an attempt to curb the preclearance power of the
DOJ. In the eyes of the Court, at least, the DOJ has overstepped its proper
boundaries and needs to be reined in.... [The] Court perceived the DOJ to have
exceeded its authority, and this perception is at least partly responsible for the
results and legal doctrines that arise from these cases.").
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time period. It is to that area of the Court's jurisprudence that this
Part now turns.
B. Race, Districting, and the Constitution, 1965-2000
Prior to its blockbuster opinions in Shaw v. Reno,7 5 and Miller v.
Johnson,76 the Supreme Court had considered constitutional chal-
lenges to racial gerrymanders on three separate occasions, striking
down only one redistricting plan on the grounds that it violated the
Fifteenth Amendment. 77 The U.S. Supreme Court first actively en-
forced the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution in the represen-
tation context in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,78 concluding that legislation
enacted to redefine the boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama, had the ef-
fect of removing from the city all but four or five of its 400 black voters
while not removing a single white voter.7 9 The Court ultimately con-
cluded that the redistricting plan would deprive blacks of the benefits
of residing in Tuskegee, including the right to vote in municipal elec-
tions, and therefore violated the Fifteenth Amendment.8 0 The Court
considered another constitutional challenge to an apportionment plan
a few years later in Wright v. Rockefeller.S1 At issue in Wright was a
New York state congressional districting plan, in which plaintiffs al-
leged the plan's districts segregated voters on the basis of race in vio-
lation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.8 2 The Court
rejected this argument and ultimately upheld the plan, notwithstand-
ing Justice Douglas' strongly worded dissent,8 3 which articulated the
concern that voters' race and ethnicity may have played too large a
role in the drawing of district lines.8 4
The Court issued its next opinion on racial gerrymandering and
the Constitution in 1977 in United Jewish Organizations of Williams-
burgh, Inc. v. Carey (UJO).85 At issue in UJO was whether New
York's use of racial criteria in attempting to comply with Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amend-
75. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
76. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ('The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.").
78. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
79. Id. at 341.
80. Id.
81. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
82. Id. at 53-54.
83. Id. at 59 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 67 ("When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial,
multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one
become separatist.").
85. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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ments of the Constitution.86 The Court reviewed the redistricting
plan, which after some consultation with the Justice Department that
led to the resubmission of a revised plan, split the Hasidic Jewish
community into two districts where nonwhite voters were the major-
ity.8 7 Plaintiffs, representatives of the Hasidic Jewish community,
challenged the plan as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
claiming that the revised plan diluted the value of their votes in order
to achieve a racial quota and assigned them to districts solely on the
basis of race.88 The Court rejected the plaintiffs argument, conclud-
ing that "neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment man-
dates any per se rule against using racial factors in districting and
apportionment."8 9
The Court's jurisprudence around the constitutionally permissible
use of race in redistricting remained stagnant and unchanged for fif-
teen years following the UJO decision, until the Court was presented
with an apportionment conundrum out of North Carolina in the case
that would become Shaw v. Reno.90
1. Shaw v. Reno and the Equal Protection Clause
The Decennial Census Report of 1990 indicated that an influx of
new residents into North Carolina earned the State an additional seat
in the U.S. House of Representatives. 9 1 As a result, the North Caro-
lina General Assembly enacted legislation in July 1991 to divide the
State into twelve congressional districts.92 The plan included one
"majority-minority" district where the majority voting age population
was African American. 93
Because forty of the State's one hundred counties were subject to
preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the state legis-
lature was required to seek approval from the Attorney General or the
86. Id. at 148.
87. Id. at 152.
88. Id. at 152-53. For further discussion on the UJO case, see Scott E. Blissman,
Navigating the Political Thicket: The Supreme Court, The Department Of Justice,
And The "Predominant Motive" In District Apportionment Cases After Miller v.
Johnson, 5 WIDENER J. PuB. L. 503, 517-19 (1996).
89. UJO, 430 U.S. at 161.
90. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
91. Id. at 633. For further background into the demographics and legislative consid-
erations in the 1990 redistricting process in North Carolina, see, for example,
Thomas C. Goldstein, Unpacking and Applying Shaw v. Reno, 43 Am. U.L. REV.
1135, 1147-51 (1996) (describing the demographics of the state and pressure
from the Democrat-led legislature to design districts that included a majority of
Democratic voters and also adhere to the one person, one vote requirement that
each district have equal populations).
92. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 633-35.
93. Id. at 633.
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District Court for the District of Columbia.9 4 In December 1991, the
United States Attorney General, acting on behalf of the Justice De-
partment, issued a formal objection to North Carolina's congressional
reapportionment plan on the grounds that the State legislature was
obligated under Section 5 to create a second majority-minority district
comprised of Native American and African American citizens in the
south-central to southeastern part of the state. 9 5 Notably, the Justice
Department's rejection of the original North Carolina plan did not rest
on a finding of retrogression-indeed, the "benchmark" districting
plan enacted following the 1980 Census had not contained any major-
ity-minority districts and therefore a plan with one such district could
only be deemed an improvement. In its letter to the State and in its
brief before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Justice Department, as it
often did prior to the Supreme Court's dual holdings in Bossier Par-
ish,96 instead appeared to have denied preclearance based on a re-
quirement under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act that the State
create the most majority-minority districts possible given the State's
demographics and geography,9 7 or based on a finding that North Car-
olina acted with a discriminatory purpose in rejecting a proposed sec-
ond majority-minority district.98
North Carolina responded to the Justice Department's rejection by
revising its congressional districting plan to create a second majority-
minority district-not in the southern part of the State as suggested
by the Justice Department, but in the north-central region along In-
terstate 85.99 The new District 12 passed through ten counties, and
94. Id. at 634. See also supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
95. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 635. See also James F. Blumstein, Racial Gerrymandering
And Vote Dilution: Shaw v. Reno In Doctrinal Context, 26 RUTGERS L. J. 517, 525
(1995) ("In its letter denying approval of the North Carolina plan, the Justice
Department identified ways in which North Carolina could have added a second
majority-black district, consistent with traditional districting principles.").
96. See supra text accompanying notes 59-66.
97. See Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, 26
RUTGERS L. J. 723, 749-50 (1995) (emphasizing that the original North Carolina
plan was "plainly nonretrogressive" but that the Justice Department's rejection
of the plan "clearly signaled to the State that the Justice Department wanted a
plan that created two majority black districts, an outcome presumably required
by Section 2; nonretrogression would not do. After the 1991 objection, then, the
state's principal concern remained Section 5 preclearance, but preclearance took
on the coloration of Section 2.").
98. Blumstein, supra note 95, at 525-27. See also Robinson 0. Everett, Redistrict-
ing In North Carolina-A Personal Perspective, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1301, 1306-07
(2001) ("[Dluring this period the Department of Justice employed with increasing
vigor its preclearance authority to deny approval of changes in voting procedures
and qualifications. In many instances, the state or political subdivision involved
would accede to the demands of the civil rights division in order to avoid delay
and litigation expenses.").
99. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 635.
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was described as a "thin band, sometimes no wider than Interstate
Highway 85, some 160 miles long, snaking diagonally across piedmont
North Carolina from Durham to Gastonia."100 Justice O'Connor
would later cite, in her majority opinion in Shaw, to a comment from
North Carolina State Representative Mickey Michaux that "[ijf you
drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of
the people in the district." 01 In the words of other observers, the
other majority-minority district, District 1, conjured up images of a
"bug splattered on a windshield" or a "Rorschach ink-blot test."1o2
The Justice Department approved the second plan under Section
5,103 setting the stage for a challenge to the plan's constitutionality. A
group of five white plaintiffs brought suit against the North Carolina
General Assembly and the U.S. Attorney General in a North Carolina
federal district court.10 4 Plaintiffs alleged that in creating the two
majority-minority districts, the State had placed too great a considera-
tion on the racial demographics and disregarded traditional district-
ing principles such as "compactness, contiguousness, geographical
boundaries, or political subdivisions"10 5 in violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. According to the complaint, the
Justice Department's enforcement of Section 5 had the effect of "coerc-
ing [North Carolina] into adopting and implementing an unconstitu-
tional plan of redistricting." 0 6
The district court rejected their claims, concluding that because
the plaintiffs were white, the plan could only violate their rights if it
was "adopted with the purpose and effect of discriminating against
white voters ... on account of their race."10 7 Because the State's pur-
pose in creating the second majority-minority district was to comply
with the Voting Rights Act-and as proportional underrepresentation
of white voters did not result from the plan-the district court con-
cluded no claim was stated and dismissed the case.108 The plaintiffs
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which noted probable
jurisdiction.
100. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
101. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 636.
102. Id. at 635.
103. Id. at 636.
104. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 462-63.
105. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 637.
106. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 465.
107. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 638 (citing Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 472). For further
discussion of the District Court's decision, see Tricia Ann Martinez, When Ap-
pearance Matters: Reapportionment Under the Voting Rights Act and Shaw v.
Reno, 54 LA. L. REV. 1335, 1342-43 (1994).
108. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 638-39.
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The Court's opinion in Shaw v. Reno,l09 authored by Justice
O'Connor and joined by four other Justices, concluded that a citizen in
a racially gerrymandered district could state a claim under the Four-
teenth Amendment if they could feasibly allege that traditional dis-
tricting principles, such as respect for political subdivisions,
compactness, and contiguity, had been set aside in deference to con-
siderations of the racial makeup of the district.110 Most notably, the
opinion expressed great concern over the shape of the districts in
North Carolina's plan, referring to them as "dramatically irregular"'11
and "bizarre."112 O'Connor emphasized the importance of appearance
in redistricting, pontificating that when "redistricting legislation... is
so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only
as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without re-
gard for traditional districting principles," the legislation could violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.11 3 Under
Shaw, such legislation would be subjected to strict scrutiny, surviving
judicial review only if the state could show a compelling interest in the
plan, and that the consideration of racial demographics when drawing
the plan was narrowly tailored to advance that interest.1 14
O'Connor's opinion in Shaw did not reach a conclusion regarding
the constitutionality of the North Carolina redistricting plan, which
was not the same plan that was at issue in Shaw. The Supreme Court
subsequently determined that compliance with the Voting Rights Act
constituted a sufficiently compelling governmental interest to with-
stand strict scrutiny, and held that the State of North Carolina was
109. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). For a detailed analysis of Shaw v. Reno and its implications,
see, for example, Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bi-
zarre Districts,"And Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances Af-
ter Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 494-97 (1993).
110. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 658 ("Today we hold only that appellants have stated a
claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina
General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face
that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting
districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient
justification.").
111. Id. at 633.
112. Id. at 644.
113. Id. at 642. Justice O'Connor also emphasized her "belie[fl that reapportionment
is one area in which appearances do matter. A reapportionment plan that in-
cludes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are other-
wise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may
have little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an un-
comfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that
members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic
status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such




therefore justified in considering race in drawing its voting district
lines.115
Shaw was nevertheless groundbreaking because it created a new,
"analytically distinct" cause of action under the Equal Protection
Clause. 1 16 After Shaw, any plaintiff living in a gerrymandered dis-
trict could allege that an apportionment plan, though facially neutral,
violated the Equal Protection Clause where it rationally could not be
understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into
different districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification.
The opinion simultaneously led to a significant rise in challenges to
various apportionment plansi17 due to confusion over how to apply its
"appearances are suspect" standard,"18 and concerns that this new le-
gal cause of action, by threatening the use of racial considerations in
redistricting, would "undo the most significant vehicle to date for
bringing heretofore excluded minorities into the halls of elective
politics."119
115. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
116. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 652 ("Nothing.. . precludes white voters (or voters of any other
race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan
rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate
citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient
justification.").
117. Esteemed election law scholar Pamela Karlan subsequently remarked that "the
Supreme Court had no real idea when it decided Shaw about the level of litiga-
tion that it was going to have to see over the next couple of years. It has six cases
that will be up there by the end of this year, and that doesn't even count the
likelihood that there will be additional cases brought up as people start to try to
apply Shaw to districting for state legislatures or local bodies." Pamela S.
Karlan, Conference: The Supreme Court, Racial Politics, And The Right To Vote:
Shaw v. Reno And The Future Of The Voting Rights Act, 44 Am. U.L. REV. 1, 3
(1994-95). See also id. (predicting that the Supreme Court would 'try and move
back somewhat from Shaw, at least to cut down on the amount of litigation").
118. Andrea Bierstein, Millennium Approaches: The Future of the Voting Rights Act
After Shaw, DeGrandy, and Holder, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1457, 1510-11 (1995) ('If it
is impermissible to assign voters to districts on the basis of their race, why should
it matter how the district to which they are assigned is shaped? Or put the other
way, if it is permissible, indeed desirable, to assign voters to districts on the basis
of their race . . . how can it become impermissible to do so when the district to
which they are assigned is irregularly-shaped?").
119. Samuel Issacharoff, Racial Gerrymandering In A Complex World: A Reply To
Judge Sentelle, 45 CATH. U.L. REV. 1257, 1262 (1996) ("There is no escaping the
fact that the consequences of [Shaw], without altering any other facet of how
representative elections are held, threatens to undo the most significant vehicle
to date for bringing heretofore excluded minorities into the halls of elective polit-
ics .... I will simply reiterate now, that we have come too far to allow legislative
bodies lacking meaningful minority representation to claim political legitimacy.
Despite the aspirations for the day that race can be put behind us... [w]e have to
face the fact that some form of racial politics and thus some need for race-con-
scious representation devices is here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future.
The only real question is how to achieve fairness in the present while struggling
for justice in the future.").
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2. The Post-Shaw Deluge: Miller v. Johnson
In the years immediately following the Court's decision in Shaw,
federal district courts in several Section 5 covered states, including
Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas, heard "Shaw-based
attacks of congressional districts"12o based on their post-1990 Census
reapportionment legislation.12 1 Inevitably, the Supreme Court recog-
nized the need to clarify its holding in Shaw and did so just four short
years later in Miller v. Johnson.122
In Miller, the Court again considered the extent to which racial
demographics could be considered in redistricting decisions. As was
the case in Shaw, the State of Georgia also gained a seat in the United
States House of Representatives following the 1990 Census. 12 3 While
African Americans comprised nearly a third of the State's population
prior to 1990, only one district, District 5, had a majority of African
American voters. 124 Accordingly, the Georgia General Assembly
adopted redistricting guidelines that "required single-member dis-
tricts of equal population, contiguous geography, nondilution of minor-
ity voting strength, fidelity to precinct lines where possible, and
compliance with [Sections] 2 and 5 of the [Voting Rights] Act."125 The
Assembly submitted the resulting Congressional apportionment plan
to the Justice Department for preclearance on October 1, 199 1.126 The
plan included two majority-minority districts, increasing the number
of Congressional districts in the state with a majority of African Amer-
ican voting age population from one to two. 127 The Justice Depart-
120. O'Rourke, supra note 97, at 743.
121. Note, Miller v. Johnson: The Supreme Court Eases The Burden of Proving Racial
Gerrymandering, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 97, 98 (1995) (describing "at least seven
states" that saw challenges to congressional redistricting plans following Shaw).
122. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
123. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1360 (S.D. Ga. 1994), affd 515 U.S. 900
(1995). For a full description of the dance between the Justice Department and
the Georgia Assembly leading up to the Miller opinion, see generally Laughlin
McDonald, Can Minority Voting Rights Survive Miller v. Johnson?, 1 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 119, 123-30 (1996) (written by the Director of the ACLU's Southern
Regional Office in Atlanta, Georgia).
124. McDonald, supra note 123, at 120. District 5 was also the only district repre-
sented by an African American, civil rights icon John Lewis. Id.
125. Miller, 515 U.S. at 906.
126. Id.
127. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1363. McDonald, supra note 123, at 127 ("The plan
contained two majority-minority districts (the Fifth, 57.8% Black VAP, and the
Eleventh, 56.6% Black VAP), and a third district, the Second with 35.4% Black
VAP.... The Attorney General objected to the plan on January 21, 1992 on the
grounds that: 'elections in the State of Georgia are characterized by a pattern of
racially polarized voting'; 'the Georgia legislative leadership was predisposed to
limit black voting potential to two black majority districts'; the leadership did not
make a good faith attempt to 'recognize the black voting potential of the large
concentration of minorities in southwest Georgia'; and, the State had provided
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ment denied preclearance of this plan, arguing that the Assembly
could have drawn one additional majority African American district
and criticizing the plan's general failure to "'recognize' concentrations
of [African Americans] in the south-west region of the state."128
The Georgia Assembly then created and submitted a second plan
that increased the black population in Districts 2, 5, and 11, preserv-
ing the two majority-African American districts and creating a third
district, District 11, where African Americans comprised 45% of the
voting eligible population. 1 29 The Justice Department rejected this
plan as well, noting that Georgia again failed to create a third major-
ity-minority district, despite the availability of alternative plans
drafted by the American Civil Liberties Union that created a third
majority-minority district by moving several densely populated black
areas into other districts.13o In response, the Georgia Assembly de-
vised and submitted a third plan 131 that made District 11 a solidly
African American majority district that included parts of Atlanta, Sa-
vannah, and outlying areas, creating a district that spanned 200 miles
and connecting, according to a federal district court that later re-
viewed the plan, four major population centers that "have absolutely
nothing to do with each other."13 2 The Justice Department approved
the third plan in April 1992,133 and voters in District 11 subsequently
sent African American Cynthia McKinney to Congress.1 3 4
The individual who McKinney beat in the race to represent District
11, George DeLoach, joined with residents of the District to challenge
the constitutionality of the apportionment plan.135 A three judge
panel concluded that District 11 was unconstitutional under the Su-
preme Court's holding in Shaw, finding that the racial makeup of the
district was "the predominant, overriding factor explaining [Georgia's]
decision to attach to the Eleventh District various appendages con-
taining dense majority-Black populations."136 As a result the district
would need to be justified by a compelling state interest, and be nar-
only pretextual reasons for failing to include in the Eleventh District the minority
population in Baldwin County.").
128. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1364.
129. Id.
130. Miller, 515 U.S. at 907. Under this plan the Macon area moved to the Second
District from the Eleventh and the Savannah area moved into the Eleventh Dis-
trict to compensate for the loss of black population. Id.
131. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1366. The third plan was passed by the General Assem-
bly by just one vote. The Speaker's vote was decisive, and according to his testi-
mony, the only reason he voted for it was to "keep the courts from doing it." Id.
132. Miller, 515 U.S. at 908.
133. Id. at 909.
134. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1369.
135. Id. at 1354.
136. Miller, 515 U.S. at 918.
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rowly tailored to further that interest, to withstand strict scrutiny.137
Notably, the district court assumed that compliance with the Voting
Rights Act could be a compelling interest sufficient to justify the use of
race in drawing district lines138 but concluded that it was not the Vot-
ing Rights Act, but the Justice Department's interpretation of the law,
that led to the requirement of a third majority-African American dis-
trict in Georgia. 13 9 But despite some evidence that Georgia's appor-
tionment plan was drawn to protect against minority vote dilution,140
the district court concluded that the State's "true interest" in drawing
District 11 to be a majority-African American district was to comply
with the Justice Department's "policy of maximizing majority-Black
districts."'4' This interest, the district court concluded, was not suffi-
ciently compelling to withstand the strict scrutiny analysis. 14 2
The U.S. Supreme Court took the case and, in a five to four deci-
sion, upheld the district court's determination that Georgia's appor-
tionment plan and the decisions surrounding its enactment violated
the Equal Protection Clause.143 Justice Kennedy delivered the major-
ity opinion in Miller v. Johnson.144 Like the district court, Kennedy's
opinion applied strict scrutiny in reviewing the redistricting plan, not
because plaintiffs had proven that the district was bizarrely shaped, a
la Shaw, but based on evidence that race was the "predominant" fac-
tor behind the Georgia legislature's decision to place a certain geo-
137. Id. at 920.
138. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1373.
139. Miller, 515 U.S. at 917-18.
140. Laughlin McDonald, attorney for the ACLU of Georgia who was involved in the
case, later explained that "Georgia, however, refused to argue directly that it had
a compelling interest in drawing the Eleventh District as a majority-Black dis-
trict to eradicate the effects of past discrimination or to avoid a section 2 viola-
tion. The State was involved in other voting rights litigation and did not want to
make admissions in Miller that might damage its position in the other cases....
[Nevertheless,] the State had a 'true interest,' which it announced at the very
beginning of the redistricting process, in creating the district as majority Black to
avoid minority vote dilution. The State's decision not to argue that it had a com-
pelling interest in eradicating the effects of past discrimination or in complying
with section 2 was made by its lawyers as a matter of litigation strategy. A ma-
jority of the Court erroneously conflated this post hoc legal posturing with the
State's real and admitted interest in not diluting minority voting strength." Mc-
Donald, supra note 123, at 130-31.
141. Miller, 515 U.S. at 942.
142. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1393. See also Dale Price, Voting Rights vs. Equal
Protection: The Continuing Battle in the Context of Redistricting, 74 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 261, 273 (1997) (describing the ACLU's "'hijacking'" of Georgia's
redistricting process in an effort to create a third majority-black district, and em-
phasizing the district court's view that the Justice Department was "'more acces-
sible-and amenable to the opinions of the ACLU'" than to state authorities).
143. Miller, 515 U.S. at 920.
144. Id. at 903.
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graphic area within a particular district.145 Notably, Kennedy
emphasized the general permissibility of considering racial
demographics, calling on courts to be "sensitive to the complex inter-
play of forces that enter a legislature's redistricting calculus" by ac-
knowledging that "legislatures will . . . almost always be aware of
racial demographics."146 Strict scrutiny of a plan, Kennedy concluded,
is triggered when a plaintiff presents evidence that the legislature
was predominantly motivated by race in creating its apportionment
plan.147
After concluding that race was the "predominant factor" motivat-
ing the legislature in drawing, and re-drawing, its apportionment
plan, Kennedy's opinion indicated that a plan would withstand strict
scrutiny if the State could "demonstrate that its districting legislation
is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest."14 8 Georgia's
plan, however, did not survive this test. The Court noted that the
Georgia legislature created the third majority-African American dis-
trict solely in compliance with the Justice Department's enforcement
of the preclearance requirements under Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act.149 While the Court acknowledged that compliance with Section 5
may provide that compelling interest generally, 150 the State's compli-
ance with the Justice Department's interpretation and application of
Section 5 was insufficient to justify the use of race in drawing the dis-
trict lines.151 In other words, Kennedy's opinion ruled that the Jus-
tice Department's rejections of the first two plans that Georgia
enacted was improper because it compelled legislative efforts not rea-
sonably necessary/narrowly tailored to the written dictates of the Vot-
ing Rights Act. 152 In the view of the lower court, Kennedy noted, the
Justice Department's application "expanded" Section 5 beyond what
145. Id. at 920.
146. Id. at 915-16.
147. Id. at 920. For an in-depth discussion of Justice Kennedy's emphasis on legisla-
tive intent in developing the "predominant factor" trigger, see Richard Briffault,
Race and Representation After Miller v. Johnson, 1995 U. CH. LEGAL F. 23, 45-51
(1995).
148. Miller, 515 U.S. at 920.
149. Id. at 920-21.
150. Id. at 921. The Court stated that regardless of "whether or not in some cases
compliance with the [substantive requirements of Section 5 of the Voting Rights]
Act, standing alone, can provide a compelling interest independent of any inter-
est in remedying past discrimination, it cannot do so here." Id. See also Clark v.
Calhoun County, Miss., 88 F.3d 1393 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that Calhoun
County, Mississippi's 1990 redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act but
interpreting Miller to find that compliance with the Voting Rights Act was a com-
pelling interest).
151. Miller, 515 U.S. at 921-22.
152. Id. at 921-24.
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Congress intended. 153 Georgia, the Court concluded, could therefore
not cite to their efforts to comply with the Justice Department's "max-
imization" definition of Section 5 as a "compelling interest" sufficient
to justify using race as a predominant motive in drafting their redis-
tricting plan. 154
Kennedy's opinion in Miller is notable for how critical it was of the
Justice Department's use of its preclearance power under Section 5 to
require a maximization of the number of majority-African American
districts in a plan.15 5 In particular, the Miller opinion scorned the
Justice Department's "use of partisan advocates" in reviewing the
State's plans and its "close cooperation with the ACLU's vigorous ad-
vocacy of minority district maximization."156 The Court further ac-
cused the Justice Department, in requiring districting plans that
maximize the number of majority-minority districts, 157 of using the
Voting Rights Act "to demand the very racial stereotyping the Four-
teenth Amendment forbids."158
3. The Post Miller and Shaw Deluge: The Constitution,
Redistricting, and the Mid- to Late-1990s
Following Miller, several additional constitutional challenges to re-
districting plans began to emerge. 1 59 Three significant cases made it
to the Supreme Court: Bush v. Vera,160 challenging the Texas congres-
sional redistricting plan; Shaw v. Hunt,16 1 a continuation of the chal-
lenges to the North Carolina congressional redistricting that went
forward after Shaw v. Reno;162 and Easley v. Cromartie,163 a chal-
lenge to the congressional redistricting plan that North Carolina en-
153. Id. at 925 (concluding that "[iun utilizing [Section] 5 to require States to create
majority-minority districts wherever possible, the Department of Justice ex-
panded its authority under the statute beyond what Congress intended and we
have upheld").
154. Id. at 925-27.
155. Id. at 924-25 (noting that the Justice Department "did adopt a maximization
policy and followed it in objecting to Georgia's first two plans"). See also Bliss-
man, supra note 88, at 541; McDonald, supra note 123, at 157-59.
156. Miller, 515 U.S. at 909.
157. Id. at 917 (citing the district court's conclusion that "'it became obvious ... that
[the Justice Department] would accept nothing less than abject surrender to its
maximization agenda'").
158. Id. at 928.
159. See Issacharoff, supra note 119, at 1265 (noting "[wie are now six years into the
decennial redistricting cycle and the avenues of exit for the courts are nowhere
readily apparent," and lamenting the "real institutional costs" of the "several"
redistricting challenges "forming a queue for further Court review").
160. 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (challenging the constitutionality of Texas' 1990 congres-
sional redistricting plan).
161. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
162. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
163. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
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acted to comply with the Court's holding in Shaw v. Reno and Shaw v.
Hunt.
In Bush v. Vera, Justice O'Conner reaffirmed and clarified Ken-
nedy's holding in Miller, finding that where "traditional districting cri-
teria" is neglected or subordinated "to the use of race for its own sake,"
the Court must strictly scrutinize a redistricting plan.164 Notably,
Justice O'Connor also asserted that "strict scrutiny does not apply
merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race.
Nor . . . to all cases of intentional creation of majority-minority dis-
tricts .... For strict scrutiny to apply .... race must be the predomi-
nant factor motivating the legislature's [redistricting] decision."16 5 In
the view of the Vera court, however, Texas went well beyond what was
necessary to comply with the mandates of Section 5. The Court ulti-
mately held that Texas had used race as a proxy for legitimate dis-
tricting principles by utilizing a computer program that provided up-
to-the-minute racial and economic statistics for each districting
change. 16 6 Based on the State's reliance on the REDAPPL computer
program and the use of other racial considerations, the Court con-
cluded that race was the predominant motivating factor. 167 Applying
strict scrutiny, Justice O'Connor rejected arguments that the plan was
narrowly tailored because of its bizarre shape. 168 And while the Court
in Vera "assumed without deciding" that a state may have a compel-
ling interest in complying with the requirements of the Voting Rights
Act169-so long as Section 5 is not applied to require the maximization
of majority-minority districts' 70-O'Connor also stated in a separate
concurring opinion that "the States have a compelling interest in com-
plying with the [Voting Rights Act]."171
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Shaw v. Hunt,172 joined by
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas, briefly reviewed and
found sufficient evidence that race was the overriding and predomi-
nant factor behind North Carolina's redistricting plan that was at the
center of Shaw v. Reno.17 3 The Court's opinion primarily focused on
whether North Carolina had a compelling interest in its predominant
use of race. 17 4 As in Miller and Vera, the Court rejected the redistrict-
164. 517 U.S. at 993.
165. Id. at 958-59.
166. Id. at 961.
167. Id. at 961-63.
168. Id. at 964-65.
169. Id. at 990 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that in order to be narrowly tailored
to this compelling interest, the districting plan would have to comply with the
Gingles test, and also adhere to traditional redistricting principles).
170. Id. at 991.
171. Id. at 992.
172. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 905.
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ing plan, emphasizing that "a map portrays the districts' deviance far
better than words," and that the district lines were "unconventional"
under any standards.17 5 Justice Rehnquist also concluded that the
challenged districts were "not required under a correct reading of [Sec-
tion] 5."176
Following the rejection of its districts in Shaw v. Hunt, the North
Carolina legislature redrew its districts a fourth time in 1997. That
apportionment plan was also challenged as unconstitutional, resulting
in the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Easley v. Cromartie.177 In
Easley, the Court upheld District 12, a near majority-minority district
where 47% of the district's voting age population was African Ameri-
can. 178 Alleging the North Carolina General Assembly impermissibly
utilized race as the "predominant factor" in redistricting, plaintiffs
once again challenged the plan as unconstitutional.179 Overturning a
district court ruling that found for the plaintiffs, Justice Breyer, writ-
ing for a five-justice majority, held that it was permissible for a state
to consider race if that consideration was a proxy for partisanship. lSO
Breyer explained that a "legislature may, by placing reliable Demo-
cratic precincts within a district without regard to race, end up with a
district containing more heavily African-American precincts, but the
reasons would be political rather than racial."181
The collateral effect of the post-Miller decisions in Vera, Hunt, and
Cromartie was to create a constitutional doctrine where bizarrely
shaped districts that are drawn to capture or exclude voters based on
their race will likely violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but districts
created in the service of the two-party system that are coincidentally
majority-African American are permissible. The cases also left open
an additional question, explicitly raised again by Justice Kennedy in
Georgia v. Ashcroft,182 of whether compliance with the Justice Depart-
ment's application or interpretation of Section 5 would lead covered
states and jurisdictions to violate the constitutional doctrine spelled
out in Shaw, Miller, and their progeny.18 3 The Bossier Parish cases
addressed this issue somewhat, in explicitly limiting Section 5
175. Id. at 902.
176. Id. at 911.
177. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
178. Id. at 240.
179. Id. at 237.
180. Id. at 246.
181. Id. at 245.
182. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). See also supra text accompanying notes 67-73.
183. But see Tokaji, supra note 25, at 802-03 ("It is unlikely that any definitive resolu-
tion can be reached as to the motivations of DOJ-either career staff or political
appointees-during the post-1990 redistricting. What is clear is that the Su-
preme Court perceived the DOJ to have a policy of maximizing majority-minority
districts, and this perception led to major doctrinal shifts. . . .The Supreme
Court's opinions in both areas strongly suggest that distrust of the manner in
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preclearance review to lead only to the rejection of actions that were
retrogressive in purpose or effect.' 8 4 But even prior to the Bossier
Parish decisions, the constitutional cases indicate that compliance
with Section 5 may in fact be a compelling state interest sufficient to
justify the use of race in congressional redistricting.1 8 5 The Court in
Miller was not concerned that Section 5's nondiscrimination require-
ment itself conflicts with the Fourteenth Amendment, but instead
criticized the Justice Department's "maximization" application of Sec-
tion 5 that, in the view of the court, went beyond what the statute
required.18 6 Thus, as commentators have noted, it is not Section 5 per
se that compelled unconstitutional behavior, but the Justice Depart-
ment's efforts throughout the 1990s to, in the words of one commenta-
tor, "hijack" and "transmogrif[y]" the text of Section 5 beyond what
Congress intended. 187
These cases each laid the constitutional ground rules for redistrict-
ing commissions charged with redrawing apportionment plans follow-
ing the 2000 U.S. Census. Predictably, plaintiffs began filing
complaints with federal courts to review redistricting plans crafted af-
ter the 2000 census with an eye towards determining whether district
shape and demographics, evidence of legislative intent, and the Jus-
tice Departments "expansive" interpretation of Section 5 would lead to
the enactment of additional unconstitutional apportionment plans. It
is to a review of these post-2000 redistricting cases that this Article
now turns.
III. SECTION 5, THE CONSTITUTION, AND REDISTRICTING
FOLLOWING THE 2000 CENSUS
Immediately following the Shaw decision in 1994, courts in several
states were forced to deal with multiple constitutional challenges to
state and congressional apportionment plans under the doctrine, al-
which the DOJ was exercising its preclearance power influenced the Court's deci-
sion making.").
184. See also supra text accompanying notes 59-66. See also Donahue, supra note 35,
at 1660-62 ("Taken together, the two Bossier Parish decisions fundamentally al-
tered the substantive standards of section 5 review. Not only is the Justice De-
partment required to find actual discriminatory effect or purpose[,] . . . its
inquiry on both counts must be limited to the question of retrogression .... [Aifter
Bossier Parish I . . . section 5 could be accurately described not as 'the god-
damnedest toughest' attempt to prevent continuing discrimination against mi-
nority voters, but rather as solely a ban on 'backsliding.'").
185. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 983 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 911
(1996).
186. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). See also Erickson, supra note 50, at 420
(noting that Miller v. Johnson represents a trend toward condemning attempts at
strict compliance with Justice Department preclearance demands).
187. See Craig Haller, E Pluribus Pluribus: The Hijacking of the Voting Rights Act and
the Resegregation of America, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 619, 621-22 (2001).
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leging that race was a significant factor in districting decisions.' 8 8
With Miller,'8 9 Shaw v. Hunt,190 and Bush v. Vera,' 9 1 the U.S. Su-
preme Court struck down plans in Georgia, North Carolina, and
Texas, respectively. Though some plans withstood the challenges, 92
the vast majority of cases led to the rejection of plans in states such as
Alabama,19 3 Virginia,' 94 Florida,195 New York,196 Louisiana,' 9 7 and
South Carolina.' 98 This rash of cases amplified concerns that race
was often too great a consideration in redistricting decisions, fueling
the debate over whether compliance with Justice Department's en-
forcement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act compelled state redis-
tricters to violate the Constitution in order to create as many
majority-minority districts as possible.' 99
By the time the 2000 U.S. Census triggered the next round of re-
districting, many legal commentators, scholars, and others who fol-
lowed the saga expected a similar deluge of court decisions finding
Shaw violations in areas where states were required to comply with
Section 5. And indeed, many cases were filed against several redis-
tricting schemes in those states, and many alleged that legislatures
violated the Shaw and Miller equal protection doctrine banning racial
gerrymandering in drawing their district lines.200
But as the following review of the claims reveals, in each state sub-
ject to Section 5 preclearance there was not one single case in which a
federal court found that a districting plan drawn after the 2000 Cen-
188. See Hebert, supra note 47, at 454 (calling the Shaw doctrine "a powerful tool in
the redistricting wars of the mid- and late-1990s").
189. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
190. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
191. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
192. See King v. Illinois Bd. of Elections, 519 U.S. 978 (1996) (mem.), summarily va-
cating and remanding King v. State Bd. of Elections, 979 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (upholding the constitutionality of a majority-Hispanic district in Illinois);
DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (upholding congressional
districts against Shaw challenge), affd., 515 U.S. 1170 (1995).
193. Kelley v. Bennett, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
194. Moon v. Meadows, 952 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1997).
195. See Johnson v. Mortham, 926 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Fla. 1996).
196. See Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (per curiam).
197. Hays v. State of Louisiana, 936 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1996) (per curiam), ap-
peals dismissed as moot, 518 U.S. 1014 (1996).
198. Smith v. Beasley, 946 F. Supp. 1174 (D.S.C. 1996).
199. See, e.g., Katharine Inglis Butler, Redistricting in a Post-Shaw Era: A Small
Treatise Accompanied By Districting Guidelines For Legislators, Litigants, and
Courts, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 137, 141-43 (2002) (discussing the pressures on com-
plying with Shaw and the Voting Rights Act in the 1990s).
200. In addition, as the subsequent analysis details, many plans were also challenged
on the grounds that districts were malapportioned, in violation of the one pei-son,
one vote principle of Reynolds, and others involved claims that a plan violated




sus violated the Shaw/Miller doctrine. There was therefore no in-
stance in the post-2000 redistricting cycle in which any plan drawn to
comply with Section 5 was found to be unconstitutional under Shaw or
Miller. States instead had internalized the lessons of Shaw and Miller
and had reached full compliance with the doctrine in the decade fol-
lowing the decisions. And as a result, the fear that compliance with
Section 5 required the Justice Department to encourage or direct "un-
constitutional conduct" in drawing district lines was, quite simply,
never realized.
A. Redistricting Litigation in the Big Three: Georgia, North
Carolina, and Texas
Litigation emerging out of Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas dur-
ing the 1990s formed the basis of the development of the Shaw /Miller
jurisprudence. From North Carolina's irregularly shaped districts to
Georgia's problematic dance with the Justice Department, these three
states were the biggest offenders of the racial gerrymandering princi-
ples. One might expect the apportionment plans in these states dur-
ing the 2000 round of redistricting to be just as problematic,
continually pushing the boundaries of permissible use of race and pos-
sibly leading to additional violations of the Shaw /Miller doctrine. Yet
a review of the cases challenging redistricting decisions made after
2000 reveals that the legislatures in these states were quick learners.
Though experiencing no shortage of challenges to their districting
plans, the states effectively internalized the lessons of their racial ger-
rymandering missteps of the 1990s and successfully defended their
apportionment plans against all claims made under Shaw IMiller.
1. Georgia
Between 2001 and 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court issued not one
but two major opinions on redistricting based on Georgia's state sen-
ate plan: Georgia v. Ashcroft,2Ol and Larios v. Cox. 20 2 Though both
opinions led to significant interpretations of redistricting law gener-
ally, in neither case did the court find a violation of the Shaw/Miller
doctrine.
Following the 2000 Census, Georgia's increase in population be-
tween 1990 and 2000 resulted in the allocation of two additional Con-
gressional seats to the State.20 3 In 2001, the Georgia General
Assembly enacted new apportionment plans for Congressional as well
201. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). See supra text accompanying notes 67-73.
202. 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
203. For a detailed overview of Georgia's redistricting litigation between 2000 and
2006, see generally Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM 2006, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29689 (N.D. Ga. May 16, 2006).
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as legislative districts for the Georgia House and Senate.2O4 The Con-
gressional apportionment plan and the plan for the state house dis-
tricts were both pre-cleared under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
in a declaratory action before the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia in 2002.205 In this same action, however, the
District Court found the state senate districting plan to be retrogres-
sive and thus in violation of Section 5.206 Though the U.S. Supreme
Court later reversed the district court's analysis of the state senate
plan in its June 2003 decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft,207 during the
appeal the Georgia state legislature passed an interim state senate
plan for the November 2002 elections. The U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia subsequently pre-cleared that interim plan on
June 3, 2002.208
This interim state senate plan and the original 2001 state house
and U.S. Congressional plans were subsequently challenged in a Geor-
gia federal district court.2 09 In Larios v. Cox, plaintiffs alleged that all
three apportionment plans were malapportioned, in violation of the
one person, one vote principle, and that plans were unconstitutional
gerrymanders based on race and partisanship. 2 10 The district court
issued a summary judgment rejecting the plaintiffs partisan gerry-
mandering claims and declined to consider the racial gerrymandering
claim,211 ultimately rejecting both the state house and senate plans as
unconstitutional violations of the Equal Protection Clause's one per-
son, one vote equal apportionment requirements under Reynolds v.
Sims. 2 1 2 The court specifically found that each district "deviates from
population equality by a total of 9.98% of the ideal district popula-
tion[,]" and concluded that "the plans arbitrarily and discriminatorily
dilute and debase the weight of certain citizens' votes by intentionally
and systematically underpopulating districts in rural south Georgia
and inner-city Atlanta, correspondingly overpopulating the districts in
204. Id. at *3.
205. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 97 (D.D.C. 2002).
206. Id.
207. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
208. Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM 2006, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *4
(N.D. Ga. May 16, 2006).
209. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1321-22 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
210. Id.
211. Pending the resolution of the preclearance process following the U.S. Supreme
Court's remanding of Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003). However, the dis-
trict court declined to reconsider and decide the case on remand. A local three-
judge court invalidated the senate plan on one person, one vote grounds and im-
plemented a court ordered plan. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga.
2004), affd 542 U.S. 947 (2004). As a consequence, the preclearance of the three
senate districts at issue in Georgia v. Ashcroft was rendered moot.
212. Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1321-22.
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suburban areas surrounding Atlanta, and by underpopulating the dis-
tricts held by incumbent Democrats."2 13
After a federal court appointed a committee to create a new legisla-
tive apportionment plan for the 2004 elections, 2 14 the Georgia Assem-
bly enacted their own plan in early 2006, Senate Bill 386, which the
Justice Department precleared the following April.2 15 Subsequent lit-
igation challenged the plan as a violation of the one person, one vote
principle and as partisan gerrymander in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, but no claims were made against the new plan under
the Shaw /Miller doctrine. 2 16 Thus, no less than one decade after the
State of Georgia's districting plan compelled the Supreme Court to
outlaw the use of race as a "predominant factor" in districting,2 17 and
despite still having some difficulty complying with the much older one
person, one vote principle of Reynolds v. Sims, the litigation surround-
ing the Georgia Assembly's apportionment plans enacted after the
2000 U.S. Census indicate that the Assembly had fully integrated
compliance with the Court's Shaw IMiller doctrine into its districting
process. 2 18
2. North Carolina
Few states have had as great an impact on the development of re-
districting and election law as North Carolina.2 19 Redistricting efforts
following the 2000 census could have continued this trend. By 2008, a
federal district court in North Carolina reviewing a fourth challenge
to a state legislature plan noted that, since the 2000 census, "the
North Carolina Supreme Court has found the General Assembly's re-
districting plans unconstitutional three times."220 But while the state
213. Id. at 1322. The court also upheld Georgia's congressional reapportionment plan,
finding that the "very small population deviations are supported by legitimate
state interests in avoiding additional precinct-splitting and in ensuring that
those precincts that are divided are split along easily recognizable boundaries
wherever possible." Id.
214. Id. at 1321-22.
215. Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM 2006, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689 (N.D.
Ga. May 16, 2006).
216. Id.
217. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
218. See also Bodker v. Taylor, No. Civ.A.1:02-CV-9990DE, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27447 (N.D. Ga. June 5, 2002) (finding that a county commissioner districting
plan violated the one person, one vote principle, but was consistent with the ra-
cial fairness requirements of Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
and did not violate other gerrymandering principles).
219. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S.
541 (1999); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
220. Dean v. Leake, 550 F. Supp. 2d 594, 597 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (citing Stephenson v.
Bartlett (Stephenson 1), 562 S.E.2d 377, 384 (N.C. 2002); Stephenson v. Bartlett
(Stephenson II), 582 S.E.2d 247, 254 (N.C. 2003)).
[Vol. 88:124
SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
supreme court has not been shy about overturning the North Carolina
legislature's redistricting plans, at no point following the 2000 census
did a state or federal court in North Carolina find a redistricting
scheme to violate the principles elucidated in Shaw and Miller. In-
deed, in the state where litigation spawned the case, Shaw v. Reno,
that led to the creation of racial gerrymandering claims, it appears
that, while the apportionment process remains flawed, the General
Assembly has fully absorbed and integrated Justice O'Connor's and
Justice Kennedy's analyses in Shaw and Miller, respectively, into
their redistricting practices.
The most significant redistricting challenge in North Carolina fol-
lowing the 2000 Census is Stephenson v. Bartlett (Stephenson I), a
case so extensive that it garnered two separate opinions from the
North Carolina Supreme Court. 22 1 On February 15, 2002, four days
after the Justice Department approved North Carolina's house and
senate district plans as non-retrogressive under Section 5, a state
court ruled from the bench that the plans violated a provision of the
North Carolina constitution that requires counties to be kept whole
when drawing state house and senate districts. 2 22 The case turned
entirely on a question of state constitutional interpretation 22 3 and did
not include any racial gerrymandering arguments in furtherance of
the Shaw IMiller doctrine. The State Supreme Court later upheld the
lower court's rejection of the plan, recognizing the fact that district
lines dividing counties ignored traditional districting principles and
violated the "whole county" requirement of the North Carolina state
constitution 22 4 "for reasons unrelated to compliance with federal
law."225 To the contrary, the court specifically cited to Shaw, empha-
sizing that the "operation of federal law does not preclude states from
recognizing traditional political subdivisions when drawing their leg-
islative districts."22 6 The court went on to emphasize in particular
that compliance with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and the state
constitution districting requirements was wholly possible. 2 27
221. Stephenson 1, 562 S.E.2d 377; Stephenson 1I, 582 S.E.2d 247.
222. Stephenson 1, 562 S.E.2d 377.
223. Stephenson v. Bartlett, 180 F. Supp. 2d 779, 782-83 (E.D.N.C. 2001) (remanding
the case to state court on the grounds that plaintiffs had challenged the 2001
legislative redistricting plans solely on the basis of state constitutional provi-
sions; thus the complaint "only raises issues of state law").
224. The whole county provision of the North Carolina constitution requires that the
physical boundaries of any such non-VRA legislative district not cross or traverse
the exterior geographic line of any such county. N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 3(3) &
5(3). See Stephenson 1, 562 S.E.2d at 384.
225. Stephenson I, 562 S.E.2d at 398.
226. Id. at 396.
227. Id. at 396 ("It remains possible, therefore, to comply with both the VRA and the
[state constitution] as reconciled with other provisions of state law.").
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Just over one year later, after the adoption of a new districting
plan to replace the plan rejected in Stephenson 1,228 the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court was again asked to review a finding from a lower
court that rejected both the state senate and house plans as a viola-
tion of the whole county and compactness requirements of state con-
stitution.229 In Stephenson II, the state court also upheld the lower
court's conclusion that both plans violated Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act because it did not maximize the number of possible "safe"
districts for voters of color.230 But the court's opinion did not explic-
itly discuss any racial gerrymandering claim under the Shaw /Miller
doctrine.
Two more recent North Carolina redistricting opinions were also
critical of North Carolina redistricting schemes but neither address
any viable Shaw IMiller claims. In Pender County v. Bartlett,23 1 the
state supreme court found violations of state constitutional law, but
did not entertain any Shaw challenges. In Dean v. Leake, 23 2 a federal
district court weighed in on "alleged constitutional defects" in the
state legislative redistricting scheme. The court evaluated five claims,
one of which was an allegation that the plan was an unconstitutional
racial gerrymander, in violation of the Shaw IMiller doctrine under
the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 233 The federal
court in Dean rejected the claims, declining to issue a preliminary in-
junction due to the lack of "any evidence of invidious intent on the part
of the General Assembly," and the court's conclusion that there was
"an insufficient amount of proof to grant the extraordinary remedy of
a preliminary injunction" in response to the allegations. 23 4
3. Texas
Georgia and North Carolina's compliance with the U.S. Supreme
Court's constitutional requirements established in Shaw and Miller in
the post-2000 Census redistricting cycle, as evidenced in the absence
of any successful racial gerrymandering challenges in both states, is
not the end of the story. An evaluation of redistricting litigation in
every other state required to comply with Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act reveals a similar complete absorption of and compliance
228. After the General Assembly enacted new house and senate plans on May 17, Su-
perior Court Judge Knox V. Jenkins threw them out and drew maps of his own.
The court's house plan was a modification of the one adopted by the General As-
sembly. The court's senate plan was a modification of one submitted to the court
by the plaintiffs. See Stephenson H, 582 S.E.2d at 248-49.
229. Id. at 247.
230. Id.
231. 649 S.E.2d 364 (N.C. 2007).
232. 550 F. Supp. 2d 594 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
233. Id. at 596.
234. Id. at 606.
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with the mandates of both Section 5 and the principles against racial
gerrymandering laid forth in the Shaw/Miller cases.
The State of Texas endured what was perhaps the most dramatic
saga of the post-2000 redistricting litigation cycle, complete with state
legislators fleeing the state-twice-in order to delay the passage of
what they viewed to be an inordinately partisan apportionment plan
for the state's congressional districts.235 The litigation surrounding
the redistricting debate began in 2001 with Balderas v. State,2 36 in
which a federal district court drew and instituted a congressional plan
for the 2002 elections. 237 In 2003, the Texas Legislature attempted to
pass a new congressional plan during its regular session, but needed
three special sessions to reach an agreement before enacting Congres-
sional Districting Plan 1374C in October 2003.238 A few months later,
several plaintiffs challenged Plan 1374C on the grounds that it was an
unconstitutional partisan and racial gerrymander and a violation of
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 239
In Session v. Perry,24 0 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas rejected the challenges and upheld the plan. In regards
to the plaintiffs racial gerrymandering claim, the court described the
evidentiary requirements in both Shaw and Miller,24 1 and concluded
that there was not sufficient proof of racial gerrymandering, instead
finding that "the single-minded purpose of the Texas Legislature in
enacting Plan 1374C was to gain partisan advantage."2 42 In reaching
this conclusion, the district court emphasized the fact that "African-
Americans in Texas vote overwhelmingly for Democratic candidates
235. See STEVE BICKERSTAFF, LINES IN THE SAND: CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING IN
TEXAS AND THE DOWNFALL OF TOM DELAY (2007); Tokaji, supra note 25, at 808.
236. No. 6:01CV158, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25740 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2001). For a
detailed account of the litigation and maneuvering that preceded Balderas, see
id. at *9-10.
237. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 461 (E.D. Tex. 2003) ("As a result of the
2002 elections, the Texas congressional delegation included seventeen Democrats
and fifteen Republicans. However, with their newly drawn state districts, legis-
lative Republicans gained control over both houses of the Texas State Legisla-
ture, as well as control over all prominent Executive Branch positions.").
238. Id. at 469-70.
239. Id. Plaintiffs also alleged that the Texas legislature was not permitted to redraw
congressional district lines mid-decade. The district court rejected this argu-
ment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to "provide any authority-constitutional,
statutory, or judicial-demonstrating that mid-decade redistricting is forbidden
in Texas." Id. at 458. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently upheld the court's
rejection of this allegation. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry,
548 U.S. 399 (2006).
240. 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (2003).
241. Id. at 470 (noting that "Miller instructs that we are to engage in a searching
review of district lines 'predominantly motivated' by race when a state subordi-
nates traditional districting practices to race").
242. Id. at 470.
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• . .belie[s] the assertion that Texas intentionally discriminated
against the African-American voters."243 The court went so far as to
find that the legislature's efforts to draw various congressional lines
"were not taken because of race; they were taken in spite of it,"244
explaining:
While keenly aware of the long history of discrimination against Latinos and
Blacks in Texas, and recognizing that their long struggle for economic and
personal freedom is not over, we are compelled to conclude that this plan was
a political product from start to finish. The myriad decisions made during its
creation were made in spite of, and not because of, its effects upon Blacks and
Latinos.... [W]e are not persuaded that this most fundamental boundary of
the Equal Protection Clause was crossed. In the redistricting arena, an area
that has proven most reluctant to yield discernible standards, there are large
incentives to reach for the seeming certainty of the Equal Protection Clause's
familiar condemnation of purposeful racial discrimination and draw upon its
comforting moral force, rather than confront the task of developing proper
standards or concede their ephemeral political character. To our eyes, the cer-
tainty is an illusion, and its deployment to heel radical partisan line-drawing
by state legislatures is a mistake. 2 4 5
After evaluating a significant amount of evidence as to the motiva-
tions of the state legislature,246 the court concluded that the plaintiffs
"ha[d] not met their significant burden of demonstrating racial
gerrymandering. "247
The district court's opinion was later vacated and remanded for re-
consideration after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Vieth v. Jube-
lirer,248 a case that addressed the ongoing justiciablity of political
gerrymandering allegations. On remand, the district court, believing
the scope of its mandate was limited to questions of political gerry-
mandering, again rejected the plaintiffs' challenge. 249 That opinion
was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and in June 2006 the Court
upheld the district court's determination that plaintiffs had failed to
243. Id. at 471.
244. Id. at 472. See also id. (noting expert testimony provided by the plaintiffs that
"'one would have a very hard time not recognizing that the State has a very
strong partisan motivation in this particular map'" led the court to its "conclusion
that politics, not race, drove Plan 1374C").
245. Id.
246. See id. at 509-12 (noting that the record before the court indicates that the "State
provided credible race-neutral explanations for Plan 1374C's county cuts, city di-
visions, and linking of border and Central Texas communities," and emphasizing
that the "record does not present evidence of statements by legislators or staff
supporting the claim that ethnicity predominated in the redistricting process. To
the contrary, the emails, statements, and other communications from those in-
volved in the process reveal that politics predominated").
247. Id. at 513.
248. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
249. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756, 758 (E.D. Tex.
2005) (rejecting "claims that the redistricting plan for the election of the thirty-
two members of Congress from Texas, adopted by the Texas legislature in 2003,
is unconstitutionally tainted by excessive partisan purpose").
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state a viable political gerrymandering claim. 250 While the Court did
find that the Texas legislature violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act in drawing the boundaries for one congressional district, District
23,251 the Justices' opinion did not need to address the race-based
equal protection arguments against the district and vacated the lower
court's determination of that claim.25 2
During the post-2000 round of redistricting litigation, Texas courts
heard several other challenges to various other post-2000 redistricting
schemes, but all have involved either a challenge under Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act,2 5 3 or arguments that districts were malappor-
tioned, in violation of the constitutional principle of one person, one
vote.2 54 Thus, no court entertained a successful racial gerrymander-
ing challenge to a Texas redistricting plan following the 2000 Census.
B. Redistricting Litigation in Other States Covered Under
Section 5
As went Texas, North Carolina, and Georgia, so went every other
state obligated to comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. No
federal or state court reviewing redistricting claims in Virginia, Mis-
sissippi, Alabama, Louisiana, South Carolina, Arizona, or partially
covered states of California, Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire,
South Dakota, Alaska, or New York, found that any state had violated
the restrictions on racial gerrymandering set forth in Shaw and
Miller. But that result certainly was not for lack of trying. Plaintiffs
in several of these states levied claims against various redistricting
schemes, alleging that, as state legislatures had done so frequently
following the 1990 Census, plans had been drawn relying on race as a
predominant factor. Yet courts reviewing such claims consistently
held that the authors of the challenged plans had internalized and
complied with the restrictions created under Shaw and Miller.
250. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 410.
253. Rodriguez v. Bexar County, 385 F.3d 853 (5th Cir. 2004) (overturning a lower
court's conclusion that Bexar County, Texas's redistricting of its Justice of the
Peace and Constable Precincts following the 2000 Census violated Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act).
254. See, e.g., Mayfield v. Texas, 206 F. Supp. 2d 820 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (dismissing a
complaint that the current congressional, senate, and house districts were malap-
portioned based on the 2000 census on standing and ripeness grounds); Perry v.
Brown, 68 S.W.3d 734 (Tex. 2001) (alleging that the 2000 census showed that the
current state senate and house districts were malapportioned); Perry v. Del Rio,





In Virginia, the most significant challenge to a districting plan
emerged in the case of Wilkins v. West.2 5 5 In November 2002, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia upheld a 2001 house and senate legislative
redistricting plan, overturning a lower court's determination that,
among other things, the plan was an unconstitutional racial gerry-
mander in violation of the Shaw IMiller line of cases.2 56 In Wilkins,
the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the lower court's finding that
race was a predominant factor in the drawing of several senate and
house legislative seats, reasoning that under Hunt v. Cromartie,2 57 a
plaintiff "asserting that a legislative redistricting plan has improperly
used race as a criterion must show that the legislature subordinated
traditional redistricting principles to racial considerations and that
race was not merely a factor in the design of the district, but was the
predominant factor... [and] that a facially neutral law is explainable
on no other grounds but race."258 The Virginia Supreme Court went
on to cite Cromartie in reasoning that "where majority-minority dis-
tricts... are at issue and where racial identification correlates highly
with political affiliation, the party attacking the legislatively drawn
boundaries must show at the least that the legislature could have
achieved its legitimate political objectives in alternative ways that are
comparably consistent with traditional districting principles."259
Based on this analysis, the Virginia court concluded that "in this
case, the defendants readily acknowledged that race was a considera-
tion in drawing the district lines," 26 0 considered in part in order to
ensure compliance with Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act.2 61
255. 571 S.E.2d 100 (Va. 2003).
256. See West v. Gilmore, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 37 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 10, 2002) (con-
cluding that 2001 house and senate redistricting plans segregated voters on the
basis of race and packed minority voters into just a few districts, in violation of
the Voting Rights Act, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and the Virginia Constitution). The circuit court specifically found that six
senate and twelve house districts were drawn along racial lines and packed as
many minority voters as possible into just a few districts in order to minimize
their political influence. Id.
257. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
258. Wilkins, 571 S.E.2d at 111-12 (Va. 2002) (emphasis in original) (citing Hunt v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241-42 (2001)).
259. Id. at 111 (citing Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 258).
260. Id. at 112.
261. Id. ("The General Assembly was required to comply with the provisions of the
VRA which mandate that a redistricting plan not dilute the African-American
voter strength, and that there be no retrogression in the plan; that is, the plan
must contain no fewer majority minority districts than the prior plan."). See
also id. at 115 ("Unquestionably, the complainants have shown that race was a
factor in designing these majority minority districts. Indeed, to comply with the
non-retrogression requirements of Section 5 of the VRA, race had to be a factor in
drawing these districts. The defendants have never maintained otherwise. The
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But because plaintiffs failed to "carry their burden of proof that race
was the predominant factor used by the General Assembly and that
qualifying alternative plans were available," the court soundly re-
jected any allegations that Virginia's state legislative apportionment
plan violated the Shaw IMiller doctrine. 262
In 2004, federal courts also heard a significant challenge to Vir-
ginia's congressional districting plan. In Hall v. Virginia,26 3 the
Fourth Circuit rejected allegations that Virginia's Fourth Congres-
sional District, as enacted in 2001 and precleared by the Justice De-
partment shortly thereafter, violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act because it diluted minority votes and significantly impacted the
ability of African American voters to elect a candidate of their
choice.264 The court rejected the claims, which did not include any
charges of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, on the grounds
that plaintiffs had not submitted sufficient evidence that "black voters
have been denied an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their
choice."2 6 5
2. Mississippi
Of the three significant challenges to redistricting plans in Missis-
sippi following the 2000 Census, only one involved a claim that the
state legislature had violated the racial gerrymandering restrictions
under the Equal Protection Clause.2 66 In Woullard v. Mississippi,
plaintiffs claimed that the Mississippi legislature relied on race as a
predominant factor in drawing one state senate district, District 45, in
record shows however, that these districts also were drawn with attention to such
factors as population equalization, compactness and contiguity, retention of core
districts where possible, and enhancement of communities of political interest.").
262. Id. at 114. See, e.g., id. ("Legislatures must balance competing redistricting crite-
ria in creating electoral districts. This record contains substantial evidence that
the General Assembly implemented a number of traditional principles of redis-
tricting in creating Senate District 2 and, accordingly, does not support the con-
clusion that race predominated in the design of the district."). Virginia Supreme
Court Justice Hassell felt so strongly about the court's conclusion that he wrote a
separate concurrence to emphasize his view that "the plaintiffs failed to establish
that the General Assembly used race as the predominant factor in the redistrict-
ing plan." Id. at 121 (Hassell, J. concurring).
263. 385 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2004).
264. Id. at 423.
265. Id. at 431.
266. See Woullard v. Mississippi, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46561 (S.D. Miss. June 29,
2006). In addition to Woullard, the other redistricting cases were Branch v.
Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003) (enjoining implementation of a congressional plan
drawn by the state court because it had not been precleared under Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act) and Garrard v. City of Grenada, 2.005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
34350 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 7, 2005) (finding that Grenada violated the Constitution's
one person, one vote principle by refusing to update the city's ward districting
scheme in light of the 2000 decennial census figures).
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Mississippi's 2002 redistricting plan.267 Plaintiffs presented evidence
that African Americans were removed from the district because of
their race, 268 and pointed to discussions with legislators that gave the
"impression" that the district "was drawn with the race-based goal of
minimizing the number of minority voters in the district."269 The fed-
eral district court, though appreciative of the evidence, concluded that
the district was redrawn with the goals of meeting equal population
requirements, complying with the Voting Rights Act, and satisfying
the requests of incumbent senators. 2 70 The court dismissed the com-
plaint, specifically holding that the Judges found "no evidence ... that
race was a predominant factor in the drafting of District 45, or any
other district."271
3. Alabama
In June 2001, two separate federal lawsuits were filed challenging
the Alabama legislature's failure to draw new districts following the
release of population figures under the 2000 Census. 2 72 As a result,
the Alabama legislature convened a special session and enacted a re-
districting plan, and both plans received preclearance under Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act.273 The plaintiffs in one of the cases then
amended their complaint to challenging the constitutionality of the
newly enacted plans. 274 The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the
2001 redistricting plans violated the constitutional requirements of
one person, one vote and constituted unconstitutional racial gerry-
mandering by overpopulating white majority districts. 27 5 The district
court rejected the arguments, holding that plaintiffs failed "to sub-
stantiate their racial gerrymandering claim" or otherwise meet their
burden to show that the state's apportionment determinations were
improperly motivated by race. 276
267. Woullard, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46561, at *8.
268. Id.
269. Id. at *24.
270. Id. at *29-30.
271. Id. at *29.
272. Montiel v. Davis, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Ala. 2002); Barnett v. Alabama, 171
F. Supp. 2d 1292 (S.D. Ala. 2001). See also, Gustafson v. Johns, 213 Fed. Appx.
872 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that a 2007 challenge asserting Alabama's 2001 leg-
islative redistricting plans violated the constitutional guarantee of one person,
one vote was barred under the doctrine of res judicata).
273. Montiel, 215 F. Supp. 2d. at 1282.
274. Id. at 1281 n.2.
275. Id. at 1282.
276. Id. at 1286-87.
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4. California
While state and federal courts in California heard various redis-
tricting challenges following the 2000 Census,2 77 the most significant
case was Cano v. Davis.278 The case grew out of a response to the
State's redistricting process, which involved the addition of one con-
gressional district and a reconfiguration of 120 districts for the state
senate and assembly.279 Several Latino voters and advocacy groups
such as the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
(MALDEF) filed suit in 2002 to challenge the legality of two congres-
sional districts and one state senate district in the plan 2SO arguing
that the three districts violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and
the Shaw/Miller doctrine under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 28 1
In Cano, the federal district court rejected the racial gerrymander-
ing claim based on a finding that plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient
evidence that the legislature's redistricting decisions were based
solely on racial considerations. 28 2 Noting that each of the Supreme
Court's "racial gerrymandering cases emphasize that a plaintiff bring-
ing such a claim faces an extraordinarily high burden," and that Shaw
violations occurred only in "exceptional" cases where race was the pre-
dominant consideration in drawing district lines, the opinion cau-
tioned that "awareness of race is essential to fairness in
districting."28 3 After a review of the plaintiffs' evidence, the court con-
cluded that "the evidence in the record suggests that the legislature
did not violate the principle that race is a permissible criterion to use
in the redistricting so long as it is not the predominant criterion."28 4
The court further emphasized that the plaintiffs were also unable to
277. See, e.g., Nadler v. Schwarzenegger, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92 (2006) (rejecting claims
that a districting plan that divided the town of Santa Clara into two state legisla-
tive districts violated the California constitution).
278. 211 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1211-12 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
279. Id. at 1211.
280. Id. See also id. at 1213 ("Plaintiffs challenge the legality of three districts: Con-
gressional District 28 . . . located in the San Fernando Valley of Los Angeles
County; Congressional District 51 . . . which includes portions of San Diego
County and the entirety of Imperial County; and State Senate District 27 . . .
which is comprised of several communities in Southeast Los Angeles County, in-
cluding parts of the City of Long Beach.").
281. Id. at 1213-14.
282. Id. at 1214-29.
283. Id. at 1215 (noting that as a result of historical discriminatory policies, "the pro-
visions of the Voting Rights Act oftentimes require a redistricting legislature to
consider the effect of its decisions on the political power of racial groups, and to
take race into account when drawing lines").
284. Id. at 1216 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 1218 ("[T]here is no evidence in
the record that either district ... is explainable only in terms of race.").
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produce any evidence that the legislature "abandoned traditional dis-
tricting principles" in drawing district lines.28 5
5. New York
There were perhaps more challenges to districting plans in New
York following the 2000 Census than in any other state. 28 6 Two cases
involved racial gerrymandering claims: Rodriguez v. Pataki2 87 and
Montano v. Suffolk County Legislature.28 8 The Rodriguez case was by
far the more protracted of the two and included eight claims against
the State's 2002 senate districting plan and congressional districting
plans. The claims primarily involved violations of Section 2 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act and the one person, one vote principle of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, but one of the claims alleged that state senate District
34, a majority white district, was an unconstitutional racial gerryman-
der in violation of Shaw IMiller.28 9 Five counts, including the one per-
son, one vote malapportionment claim, were dismissed on summary
judgment,290 with the court reviewing evidence at trial on the racial
gerrymandering claim.
At trial, plaintiffs argued that the district was not compactly
shaped, referring to it as "something like a doughnut that has had a
bite taken out of it and then been run over by a car."29 1 The State of
New York argued effectively in response that they had indeed com-
plied with the Shaw/Miller principles, that race was not a predomi-
nant factor in their determinations, and that any changes made to the
district were made to "achieve substantial population equality," pro-
tect incumbents, comply with the Voting Rights Act, and help Republi-
cans retain a majority of seats in the state senate. 2 92 The court
agreed with the State, noting that the compactness of the district was
285. Id. at 1223.
286. See, e.g., Loeber v. Spargo, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1416 (N.D.N.Y Jan. 8, 2008);
Cecere v. County of Nassau, 258 F. Supp. 2d 184, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting a
malapportionment claim against the county).
287. 308 F. Supp. 2d. 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
288. 268 F. Supp. 2d. 243 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
289. See Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 359-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (describing
all eight counts: Count I-the Senate Plan violates the "one person, one vote"
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment; Count 11-the Senate Plan violates
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; Count III-Bronx-based senate districts vio-
late Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; Count IV-SD 31 in Manhattan/Bronx
violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; Count V-Nassau County Senate dis-
tricts violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; Count VI-Suffolk County senate
districts violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; Count VII-SD 34 in the
Bronx/Westchester is a racial gerrymander in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; and Count VIII-CD 17 in the Bronx, Westchester, and Rockland counties
violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
290. Id. at 361.
291. Id. at 449.
292. Id. at 445.
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not irregular,29 3 and that there was no sufficient evidence to indicate
that race was the predominant factor in any districting decisions, 29 4
or that traditional districting principles had been subordinated to ra-
cial considerations. 29 5 The court also cited Cromartie,29 6 and empha-
sized the lack of evidence that "considerations of race rather than
politics predominated in the configuration" of the challenged senate
district.297
As Rodriguez litigation percolated through the district court, 298
other voters filed a lawsuit in Suffolk County, New York, to challenge
the redistricting plan for the county legislature. In Montano v. Suffolk
County Legislature,2 99 the federal district court for the Northern Dis-
trict of New York rejected allegations that two state legislature dis-
tricts were drawn "based predominately on rac[ial]" considerations. 30 0
In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that the districts were suffi-
ciently compact to comply with Shaw, discussed testimony arguing
that the districts had been developed using traditional, race-neutral
principles, and emphasized that plaintiffs simply failed to produce evi-




Courts in South Dakota also rejected all racial gerrymandering
challenges following the 2000 U.S. Census, with the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ultimately finding that neither
the district lines for the state legislature30 2 nor city wards drawn in
Martin, South Dakota 3° 3 were drawn in violation of the Shaw /Miller
doctrine. In Cottier v. City of Martin,3 04 the Eighth Circuit did find
that city wards in Martin, South Dakota were configured in a manner
that intentionally and effectively diluted the voting strength of Ameri-
can Indian voters, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 3 05
But the court also emphasized that race was not a predominant factor
in the decisions to craft the city wards, noting that "the shapes of the
293. Id. at 450 (noting that the district "is close to the average in compactness of all
districts in the State").
294. Id. at 455-57.
295. Id. at 457-59.
296. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
297. Rodriguez, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 460.
298. The district court's decision discussed above was summarily affirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Rodriguez v. Pataki, 543 U.S. 997 (2004).
299. 268 F. Supp. 2d 243 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
300. Id. at 269.
301. Id. at 269-70.
302. Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 461 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2006).
303. Cottier v. City of Martin, 445 F.3d 1113 (8th Cir. 2006).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1115.
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proposed districts would not draw constitutional scrutiny because the
districts are not primarily based on race."306
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit upheld a district court's determina-
tion that a proposed districting plan for South Dakota's state legisla-
ture violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,307 while also
concluding that the court's remedial plan, put in place to remedy the
violations, was not an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. In Shirt
v. Hazeltine,308 the Eighth Circuit heard arguments from legislators
defending their plan against the Voting Rights Act claims that the
court's remedial plan was improperly based on race. The appellate
court concluded that the district court's remedial plan ensured that
Native American voters had the opportunity to elect representatives
of their choice while also finding that race was only one factor, not the
predominant factor, in the court's development of the plan. 30 9 The
court reasoned that the district borders in the plan "are compact and
respect traditional boundaries," while not being "so irregularly shaped
that it seems the primary principle in shaping the district was to in-
clude or exclude Native-Americans from any one particular
district."310
7. Arizona, Florida, and the Rest
Courts in the seven states covered under Section 5 not discussed
above-Louisiana, South Carolina, Arizona, New Hampshire, Michi-
gan, Alaska and Florida-did not entertain any significant legal clams
of racial gerrymandering to post-2000 redistricting plans. The states
were, of course, not without their own redistricting sagas, and several
claims were brought in nearly every state under theories of either
malapportionment or a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.311 In South Carolina, for example, in Colleton County Council v.
306. Id. at 1118.
307. Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 387 F. Supp.2d 1035 (D.S.D. 2005).
308. 461 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2006).
309. Id. at 1020-21.
310. Id.
311. See, e.g., Ariz. Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistrict-
ing Comm'n, 366 F. Supp. 2d 887 (D. Ariz. 2005) (refusing to enforce a redistrict-
ing plan that had not yet received preclearance from the U.S. Department of
Justice); Tangipahoa Citizens for Better Gov't v. Parish of Tangipahoa, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13850 (E.D. La. July 19, 2004) (dismissing a challenge under Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act to a 2003 city council redistricting plan as moot be-
cause the plan was not precleared under Section 5); Navajo Nation v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm'n, 230 F. Supp. 2d 998 (D. Ariz. 2002) (finding that Arizona's
independent redistricting commission (IRC) had not been precleared by the Jus-
tice Department and instituting an interim court-drawn plan for use during the
2002 elections); O'Lear v. Miller, 222 F. Supp. 2d 850 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (rejecting
a political gerrymandering and Section 2 challenge to Michigan's 2001 congres-
sional redistricting plan); Braun v. Borough, 193 P.3d 719 (Alaska 2008) (finding
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McConnell3 12 a federal court heard claims that the State's legislative
districts were malapportioned and thus an unconstitutional violation
of the one person, one vote requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause. 3 13 Florida also saw a significant amount of redistricting liti-
gation, but none of the cases involved allegations that the legislature
or any county violated the Shaw/ Miller doctrine in devising their ap-
portionment schemes.3 14
C. How Section 5 Jurisdictions Achieved Universal
Compliance with the Shaw/Miller Doctrine
The above analysis illustrates the fact that state legislatures oper-
ating in the post-2000 redistricting era appear to have learned the les-
sons of the 1990s, as illustrated by their universal compliance with
both Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and the constitutional princi-
ples of Shaw and Miller. There are various explanations as to why the
Court's restrictions on the use of race in redistricting were so quickly
that a 2002 reapportionment plan's variance improperly exceeded 10%); In re
2001 Redistricting Cases, 47 P.3d 1089 (Alaska 2002) (alleging that districting
plan violated the one person, one vote principle); Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair
Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 121 P.3d 843 (Ariz. 2005);
Johnson v. State, 965 So. 2d 866 (La. 2007) (rejecting a claim to Louisiana's sys-
tem of electing judges); Below v. Gardner, 963 A.2d 785, 793-94 (N.H. 2002) (ad-
dressing arguments that some of the districts in the State's new senate
apportionment plan were malapportioned and concluding that the plan was
drawn without consideration of partisanship).
312. 201 F. Supp. 2d 618 (D.S.C. 2002).
313. Id. (creating and instituting a redistricting plan for the South Carolina state leg-
islature that complied with the principles of the U.S. Constitution and the Voting
Rights Act). In recognition of its obligations under the Shaw Miller doctrine,
however, the district court in Colleton County Council did note that the 'Voting
Rights Act must always be considered in tandem with the strictures of the Equal
Protection Clause, with the latter operating as a constant limit upon the degree
to which state legislatures-and this court acting in its remedial capacity-can
engage in race-based districting to achieve the goals of the Voting Rights Act."
Id. at 636.
314. For further details on the post-2000 Florida redistricting process and relevant
litigation, see JoNel Newman, Unfinished Business: The Case for Continuing
Special Voting Rights Act Coverage in Florida, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 15-17
(2006) (noting that "Florida's 2002 reapportionment process, similar to the 1992
process, involved controversy, allegations of partisan gerrymandering and minor-
ity vote dilution, litigation, and a Department of Justice Section 5 objection"). See
also, e.g., Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp.2d 1275 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (rejecting Sec-
tion 2 and political gerrymandering challenges to state legislature and congres-
sional plans); Florida Senate v. Forman, 826 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2002) (rejecting a
political gerrymandering claim to a Florida State Senate districting plan); In re
Constitutionality of House Joint Resolution 1987, 817 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 2002) (up-
holding a post-2000 Census based apportionment plan for the Florida Senate and
House of Representatives as complying with the one person, one vote require-




absorbed by covered jurisdictions. Most significantly is the role that
the Cromartie case has played in the development of the racial gerry-
mandering doctrine. Under Cromartie, the Supreme Court empha-
sized the importance of evaluating the partisan considerations in
redistricting decisions that may lead observers to the conclusion, how-
ever misconstrued, that race was a predominant factor in districting
decisions.3 15 For example, the Court in Cromartie emphasized that it
is permissible for state legislatures to draw district lines to include
majority Democrat precincts, even where the district may end up con-
taining more heavily African American precincts, because African
Americans as a whole lean heavily Democratic. In other words, where
partisan decisions lead to the creation of districts that appear to be
gerrymandered based on race, the Supreme Court recognized in Cro-
martie that because the underlying intent behind the creation of such
districts would be "political rather than racial," they are permissible
under the Equal Protection Clause. As a result, many districting
schemes that appeared to include a significant consideration of racial
demographics, such as Texas 3 16 and Louisiana, 3 1 7 were upheld after
defendant state legislatures argued that they drew lines based upon
the partisan make up of jurisdictions, as opposed to racial
demographics.
The other explanation for the lack of any Shaw IMiller violations
in the post-2000 redistricting era is the evolution of the Justice De-
partment's enforcement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Follow-
ing the 1997 decision in Bossier Parish I, the Supreme Court directed
the U.S. Department of Justice to grant preclearance regardless of
whether a plan violated the vote dilution principles of Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, removing pressure from Section 5 jurisdictions
seeking preclearance to maximize the number of majority-minority
districts in their plans.3 18 And after Bossier Parish H in 1999, the
Court further limited the Justice Department from denying
preclearance to any plans enacted with the intent to discriminate
against minority racial groups.3 1 9
As state efforts to draw new apportionment plans following the re-
lease of the 2000 U.S. Census demographics began to develop, 3 20 the
315. See supra discussion accompanying notes 177-184.
316. See supra discussion accompanying notes 235-254.
317. Tangipahoa Citizens for Better Gov't v. Parish of Tangipahoa, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13850 (E.D. La. July 19, 2004) (dismissing a challenge under Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act to a 2003 city council redistricting plan as moot because the
plan was not precleared under Section 5).
318. 520 U.S. 471 (1997). See supra discussion accompanying notes 59-63.
319. 528 U.S. 320 (2000). See supra discussion accompanying notes 63-66.
320. Following the 2000 Census, every state in the country was required to redraw
district lines to ensure that districts were of equal population, in compliance with
the one person, one vote principle of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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U.S. Department of Justice recognized these new interpretations of
Section 5 and issued guidelines adopting the Bossier Parish doctrines
on January 18, 2001.321 The guidelines specifically emphasized that
the Justice Department would not deny Section 5 preclearance "on the
grounds that [a redistricting plan] violates Shaw v. Reno, or on the
grounds that it violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act."322 Impor-
tantly, the regulations also articulated that compliance with Section 5
"does not require jurisdictions to violate Shaw v. Reno and related
cases," noting that the Justice Department's analysis of the post-2000
Census redistricting plans would "include a review of the submitting
jurisdiction's historical redistricting practices . . . to determine
whether the alternative plan would (a) abandon those practices and
(b) require highly unusual features to link together widely separated
minority concentrations." 32 3 In addition, the Justice Department
would evaluate "plans that make the least departure from a jurisdic-
tion's stated [traditional] redistricting criteria" with a favorable
eye.3 2
4
This change in the enforcement of Section 5 resulted in a shift
away from what many commentators view as the Justice Depart-
ment's previous "maximization" policy, where covered jurisdictions
were either encouraged or, often times, required to draw the maxi-
mum number of majority-minority districts possible in any plan in or-
der to receive preclearance.325 At the same time, the post-2000
redistricting cycle saw, for the first time, the widespread creation of
coalition or "opportunity" districts, where voters of color are not the
majority in a district, but are present in sizeable enough numbers to
have the opportunity to elect their candidate of choice. 32 6 Some schol-
ars have argued that the Justice Department's recognition of coalition
districts was crucial to ensuring that covered jurisdictions are able to
comply with both Section 5 and the Shaw/Miller doctrine of the Equal
Protection Clause. 32 7
321. Guidance Concerning Redistricting and Retrogression Under Section 5 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 5412 (Jan. 18, 2001).
322. Id. at 5412.
323. Id. at 5413.
324. Id.
325. See, e.g., Tokaji, supra note 25, at 800-03 (describing the debate over whether the
1990s Justice Department promoted the maximization of majority-minority dis-
tricts in covered jurisdictions, and noting that, at the very least, "the Supreme
Court perceived the DOJ to have a policy of maximizing majority-minority
districts").
326. Butler, supra note 199, at 243 (describing how the Justice Department's 2001
guidelines "hint that their past policy of 'maximization' of the number of major-
ity-minority districts will be modified to press jurisdictions to maximize minority
'opportunity' districts").
327. See Daniel A. Zibel, Turning the Page on Section 5: The Implications of Multira-
cial Coalition Districts on Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 103 MIcH. L. REV.
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This combination of the change in the Justice Department's en-
forcement of Section 5 and the Supreme Court's softening of the
Shaw/Miller doctrine through the recognition of the role of partisan-
ship in Cromartie could explain the post-2000 synchronicity of Section
5 and the Equal Protection Clause. But the story does not end there.
In 2006, Congress weighed in on Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
extending the provision for an additional twenty-five years in re-
sponse to mountainous evidence of ongoing discrimination in covered
jurisdictions. 328 Part IV of this Article details the reauthorization and
analyzes whether the Congressional amendments to Section 5 will al-
ter the above described synergy between the Constitution and the Vot-
ing Rights Act.
IV. DID THE 2006 REAUTHORIZATION OF SECTION 5
AFFECT THE CURRENT SYNERGY BETWEEN SECTION 5
AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE?
The above analysis suggests that Section 5 jurisdictions have ab-
sorbed the lessons of Shaw and Miller, enduring an entire round of
redistricting litigation without a single court finding that any state
violated the constitutional mandate against racial gerrymandering.
But in 2006, Congress held hearings over whether to extend Section 5,
and other provisions of the Voting Rights Act, in light of their looming
expiration in 2007. In response to mountains of evidence that the pro-
visions were still needed,3 29 Congress voted to reauthorize Section 5
for an additional twenty-five years, while also making a few adjust-
ments and amendments to the provision to ensure it achieves the goal
of its "original purpose."3 30 The amendments specifically require the
189, 207-13 (2004) (arguing that "if a [Section 5 covered] jurisdiction is presented
with the option of creating either coalition districts or equally effective majority-
minority districts in order to comply with section 5, the Equal Protection Clause
mandates the creation of coalition districts" and referring to the creation of coali-
tion districts "as a partial solution to the tension between section 5 and the Equal
Protection Clause").
328. See VRARA, supra note 17. See generally, e.g., ELLEN KATZ, Not Like the South?:
Regional Variation and Political Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in
VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY,
PARTICIPATION AND POWER 183-221 (Ana Henderson ed., 2007); Kristen Clarke,
The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights Act: How Much Dis-
crimination Can the Constitution Tolerate?, 43 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385
(2008).
329. For a detailed description of the voluminous evidence presented to Congress on
the need for an extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in particular, see
generally Clarke, supra note 328.
330. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 (Part I): Hearing on H.R. 9 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
1 (2006).
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rejection, under Section 5, of any new apportionment plan or other
change that is motivated by a discriminatory purpose and clarifies
that covered jurisdictions submitting apportionment plans are re-
quired, under Section 5, to protect a minority community's ability to
elect their preferred candidate of choice. 33 1
Because the redistricting litigation cycle ended prior to the 2006
reauthorization, a question remains over whether any of the amend-
ments to Section 5 will affect the previously described complimentary
existence of Section 5 and the Equal Protection Clause. This section
details these amendments to Section 5 and analyzes whether their en-
forcement can be expected to alter the current consistency between
the provision and the Shaw /Miller interpretation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. It concludes that the amendments to Section 5 will not
alter the ability of covered jurisdictions to comply with both Section 5
and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
In 2006, Congress passed the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and
Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amend-
ments Act of 2006 (VRARA) renewing several key provisions of the
Act, including Section 5.332 Specifically, in response to evidence
presented at nearly twenty hearings,3 33 Congress voted to extend Sec-
tion 5 for an additional twenty-five years and included amendments
that clarified aspects of the provision in response to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Bossier Parish II334 and Georgia v. Ashcroft.33 5
So if, as this Article contends, compliance with Section 5 did not
compel any unconstitutional behavior in the 2000 round of redistrict-
ing, the question becomes whether Section 5, as reauthorized in 2006,
will compel any unconstitutional behavior in 2010 and beyond. This
section argues that none of the changes to Section 5 during the
reauthorization process should give rise to any concern of unconstitu-
tional behavior. In particular, I detail how the two aforementioned
amendments to Section 5-a reinvigoration of the intent standard and
a protection of a community's opportunity to elect their preferred can-
331. See VRARA, supra note 17.
332. The House passed the bill by a vote of 390 to 33 on July 13, 2006. 152 CONG. REC.
H5207 (daily ed. July 13, 2006). The Senate unanimously approved the bill, with
a vote of 98 to 0. 152 CONG. REC. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006).
333. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 328; David H. Harris, Jr. & Trish Hardy, A Good Fix
But Not the Cure-Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting
Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 224,
229-32 (2007). For more information on the deliberations leading to the
reauthorization of Section 5, see generally, for example, Kousser, supra note 32;
Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117
YALE L.J. 174, 183-91 (2008); Tokaji, supra note 25; James Thomas Tucker, The
Politics of Persuasion: Passage of the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization Act of
2006, 33 J. LEGIS. 205 (2007).
334. 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
335. 539 U.S. 461, 480 (2003).
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didate-do not require authors of redistricting plans to use race as a
predominant factor or otherwise violate the U.S. Constitution.
A. The Bossier Parish II "Fix"
The central holding of Bossier Parish II was an interpretation of
Section 5's language that preclearance could only be denied if a
change was retrogressive in purpose or effect. 336 This interpretation
substantially altered the preclearance review process, which previ-
ously had involved the denial of any change to election law or proce-
dure that was enacted with an intent to discriminate against minority
voters. 33 7 In the years immediately following the decision, which was
issued in January 2000, just prior to the post-2000 round of redistrict-
ing, the Justice Department's objections to changes dropped signifi-
cantly.33 8 Only a very small number of objections were based on
retrogressive intent.3 39 In his statement before the House Judiciary
Committee on the effect of Bossier II on the enforcement of Section 5's
original purpose, Mark Posner, a former attorney with the Depart-
ment of Justice, testified that "voting changes rarely, if ever, will be
motivated by an intent to retrogress [without a corresponding] retro-
gressive effect."3 40
Taking Posner's and others' testimony into account, the
reauthorized Section 5 clarified the language of the provision to en-
sure that any covered change that was enacted with the intent to dis-
criminate against voters based on race, color, or language minority
status would also be denied preclearance. 34 1 In particular, Congress
added language emphasizing that the term "'purpose" under Section
5 "shall include any discriminatory purpose."342 As a result, the Jus-
336. Bossier Parish 11, 528 U.S. at 334. See supra text accompanying notes 64-73.
337. Posner, supra note 43, at 114-15(describing the effects of the Justice Depart-
ment's reliance on discriminatory purpose as the basis for objections under Sec-
tion 5, noting that "discriminatory purpose was the basis for about a third of the
objections to post-1980 Census plans and about four-fifths of the objections to
post-1990 Census plans").
338. See Peyton McCrary, The End of Preclearance As We Knew It: How the Supreme
Court Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 275,
313-15 (2006) (describing the Justice Department's forty-one objections after the
second Bossier Parish decision, "compared with 250 objections during a compara-
ble period a decade earlier").
339. Id. at 314-15 (describing the two objections based solely on retrogressive intent).
340. Abigail Thernstrom, Focus On the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act: By Now, a Murky Mess, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 41, 67 (2007) (citing
REPORT To THE UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REGARDING THE EXTEN-
SION OF THE TEMPORARY PROVISIONS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, 18
(2004)).
341. For a detailed account of the specific changes to the language of Section 5 to effect
this clarification, see Harris, supra note 333, at 244-46; Tucker, supra note 333,
at 221-22.
342. VRARA, supra note 17, at § 5(c).
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tice Department was explicitly authorized to resume its pre-2000
practice of denying preclearance to any districting plans or other
changes enacted with an intent to discriminate against voters of
color. 3 4 3
Enter the preceding analysis of the post-2000 synergy between the
Shaw Miller doctrine and Section 5 during the 2000 redistricting cy-
cle, where all Section 5 compliant plans also complied with the Equal
Protection Clause restrictions on racial gerrymandering. But there is
no indication that Congress's decision to reinstitute the "purpose"
prong of Section 5, prohibiting any changes to redistricting or other
election laws enacted with a discriminatory purpose, will lead jurisdic-
tions to use race as the predominant factor in their districting deci-
sions, thus violating the Fourteenth Amendment in order to comply
with Section 5.
First, the purpose prong of Section 5 fits squarely within the dis-
criminatory intent restriction under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The Fifteenth Amendment in
particular explicitly and clearly prohibits the denial or abridgement of
the right to vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude."344 By reinstating the purpose prong of Section 5, Congress
merely ensured that unconstitutional acts of intentional discrimina-
tion, violations of the Fifteenth Amendment, would not be granted
preclearance under Section 5.345 Such an act would seem to be within
the scope of Congress's mandate under the Constitution to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment. Reinstating the "purpose prong" therefore ul-
timately results in ensuring that covered jurisdictions comply with the
anti-discrimination provisions of the U.S. Constitution.
In addition, there is no evidence that complying with the Fifteenth
Amendment of the Constitution will alter the ease with which covered
jurisdictions now comply with both the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. Importantly, the Section 5
objections that led to a dissonance between the two provisions in cases
like Shaw v. Reno and Miller v. Johnson involved violations of Section
5 not based on evidence that the plans diluted minority votes or were
343. See Harris, supra note 333, at 246-47 (citing to the testimony of Debo Adegbile,
Associate Director of Litigation of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc., explaining that the change would ensure that "in situations where
sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent exists" the submitting jurisdiction
will not "meet its Section 5 burden"); Kousser, supra note 32, at 754 (arguing that
"failure to overturn Bossier II would have doomed Section 5 to disuse, as it essen-
tially had since 2000).
344. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
345. Posner, supra note 43, at 416 (noting that the reauthorization of Section 5 and
reinstitution of the purpose prong "did not, of course, alter the meaning of this
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment right, and Congress did not amend section
5 so as to expand the focus of the statute beyond the right to vote").
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potential violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The basis for
the Justice Department's rejections of North Carolina's congressional
districting plans in Shaw were not based primarily on a finding that
the state legislature was intentionally seeking to discriminate against
voters of color in the state. It was based on a determination of vote
dilution, or a conclusion that the state was not drawing the maximum
number of majority-minority districts that it could under the
demographics of the state.34 6 It was the revisions of those plans, done
at the urging of the Justice Department's efforts to maximize the
number of majority-minority congressional districts, that led the
North Carolina state legislature to draw district lines that eventually
were found to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Similarly, the revisions of Georgia's congressional districting plan
at the center of Miller v. Johnson were based upon the Justice Depart-
ment's rejection of submitted plans because the Department believed
that additional majority-minority districts could be created based on
its review of alternative plans. As in Shaw, it was the Justice Depart-
ment's requirement of the creation of a third majority-minority dis-
trict in the state to survive preclearance, and Georgia's use of race as
the predominant factor in their districting decisions in acquiescence to
that demand, that led Justice Kennedy and a majority of Justices to
reject the plan as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Other
than its refusal to maximize the number of majority-minority districts
in its plan, Georgia was not directly accused of acting with a discrimi-
natory purpose in developing its districting plans.3 47
In fact, the Justice Department's rejection of the districting plans
in Shaw and Miller was based primarily on an interpretation of Sec-
tion 5 that was explicitly overruled in Bossier Parish J.348 That inter-
pretation, which required the rejection of apportionment plans that
failed to maximize the number of majority-minority districts or other-
wise caused vote dilution in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, was discontinued when the Court ruled that such objections were
not permitted under Section 5.349 Notably, none of the amendments
346. See supra text accompanying notes 91-119.
347. See Posner, supra note 43, at 112-13 (arguing that the Supreme Court's criticism
of the Justice Department's interpretation of Section 5 was aimed at the Depart-
ment's policy of maximization, not "purpose-based redistricting objections"); id. at
93 (noting that "in Miller the [Supreme] Court did not express any concern that
section 5's nondiscrimination requirement itself conflicts with the Fourteenth
Amendment but instead indicated that the Justice Department's purported ille-
gitimate application of that standard did not comport with the Amendment's
dictates").
348. 520 U.S. 471 (1997). See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
349. Id.
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to Section 5 altered this interpretation.3 50 And just as the covered
jurisdictions internalized compliance with the Shaw/Miller doctrine
during the 2000 redistricting cycle,3 5 1 Congress's silence on Bossier
Parish I implies acquiescence to and acceptance of the Supreme
Court's view that preclearance cannot be denied based on the fact or
intimation that a plan or election change violates Section 2, or any
other provision of the Voting Rights Act.
B. Clarifying Georgia v. Ashcroft and the "Ability to Elect"
The other major change to Section 5 during the redistricting pro-
cess emerged out of an effort to clarify the retrogression standard that
the Supreme Court had altered in its 2003 decision in Georgia v. Ash-
croft.3 5 2 The Court's decision in Georgia v. Ashcroff, as discussed pre-
viously, found that a districting plan that reduced the voting age
population in a few of the State's legislative districts from over 65%
African American to just over 50%, and adjusting down other districts
so that the African American population went from just over 50% of
the VAP, down to 30-40% of the voting age population,353 was not ret-
rogressive because, under the totality of the circumstances, the Geor-
gia districting plan maintained the ability of African American voters
to "play a substantial, if not decisive, role in the electoral process" or to
"influence the political process," even if their ability to win elections
was diminished.354
There has been some debate about whether the VRARA overruled
the retrogression standard articulated in Georgia v. Ashcroft,355 in
part because the standard itself was somewhat ambiguous. An exami-
nation of the textual changes to Section 5 itself and the underlying
350. See Posner, supra note 43 (discussing how the VRARA did not reverse Bossier
Parish I).
351. See supra text accompanying notes 315-27.
352. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). See also supra text accompanying notes 67-73.
353. Id.
354. For further discussion on the implications of the Georgia v. Ashcroft retrogression
standard, see generally, for example, Karlan, supra note 2; McCrary, supra note
338, at 315-22 (describing the various types of districting schemes that would not
be retrogressive under the holding in Georgia v. Ashcroft).
355. See, e.g., David L. Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Does the New VRA Section 5
Overrule Georgia v. Ashcroft?, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 631 (2008) (conclud-
ing that the effect of the amendments to VRARA did not alter or overrule the
Court's opinion in Georgia v. Ashcroft "in any meaningful way because, regard-
less of how it is interpreted, the VRARA either (a) allows a diminution of the
overall probability that minorities are elected to office or (b) allows states to make
exactly the types of tradeoffs in favor of influence districts that supporters of the
new language sought to avoid"); Kousser, supra note 32, at 757; Tucker, supra
note 333, at 222-23 (noting that "the VRARA restored the standard for determin-
ing discriminatory [retrogressive] effect that had been in place for three decades"
until Georgia v. Ashcroft).
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legislative record and reports from the House Judiciary Committee in-
dicates that the amendments primarily clarify the retrogression stan-
dard under Section 5 to emphasize that "ability to influence" is not the
same as "ability to elect."3 5 6 Thus, most plans will likely be found
retrogressive if, when compared with the benchmark plan they are re-
placing, they substitute majority-minority districts (where the voting
strength of minority voters can determine the winner in an electoral
contest) with influence districts (districts where minority voters can
exert influence over who wins an electoral contest and/or their subse-
quent policy decisions).357 In that way, the amendments to Section 5
do reject the Supreme Court's analysis in Georgia v. Ashcroft, because
central to that decision was Justice O'Connor's determination that the
replacement of majority-minority districts with influence districts was
not retrogressive because the plan did not diminish African Ameri-
cans' ability to influence the electoral process. 358
But at the same time, a districting plan that replaces majority-mi-
nority districts with influence districts may not be retrogressive per se
if the community's ultimate "ability to elect" their candidate of choice
is not diminished.359 This is because the amendments to Section 5
emphasize that the provision is in place to protect a community's abil-
ity to elect candidates of their choice, not merely influence the out-
come of the election or the policy choices of elected officials. Indeed,
the actual language that Congress added to Section 5 in 2006 states
specifically that any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, or practice, or procedure with respect to voting that has the
purpose of or will have the effect of diminishing the ability of any citi-
zens of the United States on account of race or color, . . . to elect their
356. See also Persily, supra note 333, at 247-49 (arguing that "the new section 5
squarely rejects the notion that ability-to-elect districts can be eliminated (or
traded off with influence districts) as part of an overall plan to increase minority
influence in the legislature as a whole").
357. See, e.g., Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 355, at 651 (noting that "the standard
rejects the notion that 'ability-to-elect' districts can be traded for 'influence' dis-
tricts"); Erica Lai, Appended Post-Passage Senate Judiciary Committee Report:
Unlikely "Legislative History" For Interpreting Section 5 of the Reauthorized Vot-
ing Rights Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 453, 467 (2007) (describing how congressional
leaders involved in crafting the new standard "condemned influence and coalition
districts as failing to ensure that minorities retain their ability to elect their can-
didates of choice"). For a detailed discussion of the implications of such "trade-
offs" and the effects of influence districts generally, see Persily, supra note 333, at
235-37.
358. Persily, supra note 333, at 234-36 (noting that the Georgia v. Ashcroft holding
"relaxed the constraint of section 5 by allowing covered jurisdictions to trade off
'ability to elect' districts with so-called influence districts").
359. For an extensive discussion on the various interpretations of the ability to elect
standard, see Persily, supra note 333, at 235-45.
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preferred candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to vote
within the meaning of subsection (a) of this section." 360
There was and is still considerable debate over how great a per-
centage of the voting age population a group must comprise in order to
have the "ability to elect" their candidate of choice. 361 But under the
new language it is feasible that, in the few situations where minority
voters are "able to elect" candidates of their choice in districts where
they comprise less than 50% of the voting age population, covered ju-
risdictions might not be required to draw or even maintain districts
where the minority group comprises more than 50% of the voting age
population (majority-minority districts). Or, as was the case in Geor-
gia v. Ashcroft, under the amended Section 5, a plan that takes voters
of color out of majority-minority districts and places them in districts
where they are less than a majority of the voting age population will
not be retrogressive-but only when the facts on the ground indicate
that minority voters in influence districts will maintain their ability or
power to elect the candidate of their choice. 3 62
And importantly, the 2006 amendments to Section 5 comport with
the Court's attempt in Georgia v. Ashcroft to create a more flexible
retrogression analysis that considers multiple factors in analyzing
whether a new plan diminishes a community's ability to elect their
candidate of choice. Thus, under the new standard, while a reduction
in the number of majority-minority districts will generally have a ret-
rogressive effect on a community's ability to elect the representative of
their choice, Section 5 compliance now may not necessarily require the
creation or maintenance of majority-minority districts in areas where
minority voters are able to elect their candidates of choice through
building reliable and consistent partnerships with other constituen-
cies, including white voters.3 63 In addition, the congressional record
360. VRARA § 5(3)(b), supra note 17 (emphasis added).
361. See Kousser, supra note 32, at 755-58 (describing the congressional deliberations
over the "ability to elect" language and noting that "[tihe crucial point, which was
left in a muddle, was how large the group had to be in order to be considered able
to elect its preferred candidate"). See also Persily, supra note 333, at 234-36
(describing the existing "disagreement about ... how one determines minorities'
'ability to elect'").
362. See Tucker, supra note 333, at 263 (emphasizing the "fact-specific" nature of the
'ability to elect" standard, noting that the language "recognizes that minority
voters may be able to elect candidates of their choice with reliable crossover sup-
port and, thus, does not mandate the creation and maintenance of majority-mi-
nority districts in all circumstances").
363. See, e.g., Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 355, at 651. See remarks from Sena-
tor Leahy during the reauthorization (noting that "[tihe amendment to section 5
does not, however, freeze into place the current minority voter percentages in any
given district.... There is no 'magic number' that every district must maintain to
satisfy the 'ability to elect' standard... ."). 152 CONG. REC. S8005 (daily ed. July
20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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indicates that the "ability to elect" language also protects the mainte-
nance or creation of "naturally occurring majority-minority districts,"
or districts drawn with the use of "legitimate, neutral principles...
such as attention to county and municipal borders," that just happen
to capture or include a "large and compact minority population," thus
creating, naturally, a "district in which racial minorities form a
majority."364
In part because of the new standard's flexibility and recognition of
"naturally occurring" districts, it is highly unlikely that efforts to com-
ply with the new standard will alter the synergy between the Equal
Protection Clause and Section 5 exhibited during the 2000 redistrict-
ing process. For one, the plans at issue in all of the redistricting cases
following the 2000 census, as described in Part II of this Article, were
pre-cleared prior to the Court's alteration of the retrogression stan-
dard in Georgia v. Ashcroft.365 Thus, even if the amended standard
simply and explicitly rejected the court's holding in Georgia v. Ash-
croft and returned the retrogression standard to its previous state, the
2000 round of redistricting illustrates that, in the years since the
Miller decision, states have developed satisfactory methods of comply-
ing with both the pre-Georgia v. Ashcroft retrogression standard and
the requirements of the Shaw/Miller doctrine.
In addition, the Court's paramount concern in Miller in particular
was that the Justice Department was enforcing Section 5 in a way
that mandated that states create or maximize the number of majority-
minority districts included in any particular plan. 3 66 As discussed
above, the VRARA's "ability to elect" clarification promotes a fact-in-
tensive analysis of whether, under a new plan, the ability of a minor-
ity voting population to elect their candidate of choice is diminished.
Such a review may allow for the replacement of majority-minority dis-
tricts with influence districts. As discussed above, the retrogression
analysis also allows for preclearance when plans draw "naturally oc-
curring" majority-minority districts, which is directly in line with the
ShawlMiller doctrine of ensuring that traditional districting princi-
364. One narrow view of the amendments to Section 5 is that retrogression only occurs
when covered jurisdictions submit plans that do not include naturally occurring
majority-minority districts, but this interpretation is not the dominant view. For
a detailed discussion of why this interpretation is problematically narrow, see
Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 355, at 649-51 (noting that, among other
things, retrogression should not apply only to minority voters living in urban ar-
eas, as opposed to minority voters elsewhere in the state and that such an inter-
pretation is based on inherently partisan interests). For a detailed discussions on
the origins of the "naturally occurring" interpretation of the "ability to elect" lan-
guage in the Senate Report, see Lai, supra note 357, at 469-71.
365. See supra text accompanying notes 351-62.
366. Miller v'. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-22 (1995).
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pals are paramount to racial considerations in drawing district
lines.3 6 7
Because we are still a few years removed from the 2010 redistrict-
ing cycle, there has yet to be any significant evidence of just how the
Justice Department will interpret and apply either amendments to
the renewed Section 5. But all realistic indications and perspectives
on their possible application signify that the Justice Department's en-
forcement power was not altered in such a way that it would return
the Department to its previous-post-1990, pre-2000-method of re-
viewing apportionment plans that led to Justice Kennedy's critique of
the Department in Miller.
V. CONCLUSION
As the preceding analysis indicates, a review of the actions on be-
half of Congress, the Justice Department, and the covered jurisdic-
tions in the years following the introduction of the Shaw/Miller
doctrine indicate that entities appear to have internalized full compli-
ance with that line of decisions. First, an entire redistricting cycle has
been completed following the 2000 Census, during which there was
not one instance in which a court found that a jurisdiction covered
under Section 5 was compelled, in its efforts to comply with the provi-
sion, to violate the racial gerrymandering restriction of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Second, the above review of the changes to Section 5
during the 2006 reauthorization process indicates that none of the
substantive amendments to the provision stand to threaten the syn-
ergy between the two provisions. All indications are that covered ju-
risdictions have fully adapted to the requirements of Shaw and Miller,
and there is little evidence that the recent changes to Section 5 will
compel jurisdictions alter their already internalized compliance with
the Constitution.
As a result, the concerns raised in Justice Kennedy's concurrence
in Georgia v. Ashcroft have indeed been addressed in both the judicial
and legislative cabining of the Justice Department's enforcement of
Section 5 and covered jurisdictions' own efforts to comply with the re-
quirements of the Equal Protection Clause. The "fundamental flaw"
that Kennedy refers to in Georgia v. Ashcroft is a flaw no longer.
When it comes to redistricting plans, Section 5 and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause are able to enjoy a shared existence.
367. See Persily, supra note 333, at 239 (referring to the standard's "focus on naturally
occurring majority-minority districts" as an "admonition to the DOJ to avoid forc-
ing jurisdictions to create or maintain Shaw-violative districts").
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